

2015 Starter Packet

SSRA Aff and Terrorism Disadvantage

Topic – Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.



More resources at



[/atlantadebate](#)

atlantadebate.org

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| ***How To*** | 4 |
| What Is Policy Debate? | 5 |
| Speeches and Speech Order | 6 |
| The Constructive Speeches | 7 |
| The Rebuttal Speeches | 9 |
| How to write a block and why? | 12 |
| Judge Adaptation | 14 |
| Cutting Cards | 15 |
| Using Articles | 17 |
| ***Sample IAC and INC*** | 18 |
| How To Use This Section | 19 |
| Glossary | 20 |
| Sample IAC | 23 |
| Sample INC Disadvantage | 27 |
| Sample INC Answer to Privacy Rights Advantage | 29 |
| Sample I NC Answer to Solvency | 30 |
| ***Affirmative and Article Summaries*** | 31 |
| Affirmative Summary – Surveillance State Repeal Act | 32 |
| Article Summaries – Affirmative | 33 |
| Article Summaries – Negative | 34 |
| ***Affirmative Articles*** | 36 |
| Affirmative Article 1: The Status Quo | 37 |
| Affirmative Article 2: How do we solve the problem | 38 |
| Affirmative Article 3: Why Privacy Matters | 39 |
| Affirmative Article 4: Why Liberty Is More Important Than Security | 40 |
| Affirmative Article 5: Does Surveillance Stop Terrorism? | 42 |
| Affirmative Article 6: Is Terrorism Really A Threat? | 43 |
| Affirmative Article 7: Would Surveillance Have Stopped 9/11? | 44 |
| Affirmative Article 8: Is Nuclear Terrorism Possible? | 45 |
| ***Negative Articles*** | 46 |
| Negative Article 1: Why Surveillance Isn't A Problem | 47 |
| Negative Article 2: Does The Plan Stop Private Surveillance? | 48 |
| Negative Article 3: Does The Plan Stop NSA Surveillance? | 49 |
| Negative Article 4: How Current Laws Prevent Terrorism | 50 |
| Negative Article 5: How The Plan Causes Terrorism | 51 |
| Negative Article 6: The Impact To Terrorism | 52 |
| Negative Article 7: Why Terrorists Could Use Nuclear Weapons | 53 |
| Negative Article 8: Why Security Is More Important Than Liberty | 54 |
| Negative Article 9: Why the NSA surveillance is not a bad thing | 55 |
| How To Use The Templates | 56 |
| 1 st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template | 57 |
| 1 st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template | 58 |
| 1 st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template | 59 |
| 1 st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template | 60 |
| 1 st Negative Constructive (INC) Template: Disadvantages | 61 |
| 1 st Negative Constructive (INC) Template: Disadvantages | 62 |

2015 Atlanta Urban Debate League

Starter Evidence Packet (SSRA Affirmative and Terrorism Disadvantage)

Ist Negative Constructive (INC) Template: On-Case Arguments 63
Ist Negative Constructive (INC) Template: On-Case Arguments 64



*****How To*****



What Is Policy Debate?

Policy debate is a type of debate competition in which teams of two advocate for and against a resolution that typically calls for policy change by the United States federal government, this format tests a student's research, analytical, and delivery skills.

It involves the proposal of a plan by the affirmative team to enact a policy, while the negative team offers reasons to reject that proposal. Throughout the debate, students have the opportunity to cross-examine one another. A judge or panel of judges determines the winner based on the arguments presented.



Speeches and Speech Order

There are eight total speeches in a debate round. Each debater gives two speeches: one “constructive” and one “rebuttal.” The speech order looks like this:

Speech Cheat Sheet

Speech Order and Responsibilities

(all speech times in minutes)

| | Jr. High | H.S. | College |
|---|----------|------|---------|
| <u>CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECHES</u> | | | |
| IAC — Read the case and plan. | 4/5 | 8 | 9 |
| CX — 2NC asks the questions. | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| INC — Makes all the major negative arguments (disadvantages, case arguments, etc.) | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| CX — IAC asks the questions. | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 2AC — Answer ALL negative arguments. Rebuild and strengthen the case. | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| Point out arguments that the negative has not attacked. | | | |
| CX — INC asks the questions. | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 2NC — Present any additional case arguments not covered by INC. | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| Remember to take only part of the negative arguments — leave some for the INR speech | | | |
| <u>REBUTTAL SPEECHES</u> | | | |
| INR — Present all other negative arguments not covered in the 2NC. Do not present. | 2 | 5 | 6 |
| the same arguments as your partner. Decide ahead of time who will cover which arguments. | | | |
| IAR — Answer ALL of the negative arguments from both the 2NC and the INR. | 2 | 5 | 6 |
| Any dropped argument could mean a negative victory. | | | |
| 2NR — Pick a few arguments that you think the negative side is winning and concentrate | 2 | 5 | 6 |
| on those. Tell the judge exactly why to vote for you. Tell the judge why the negative arguments outweigh the arguments of the affirmative | | | |
| 2AR — Respond to negative arguments. Point out any arguments that have been dropped | 2 | 5 | 6 |
| by the negative team. Tell the judge why you win. Tell the judge why the affirmative | | | |

The debater who gives the IAC also gives the IAR, and the debater who gives the INC gives the INR. So, each debater can think of themselves as the IA (the person who gives the IAC and IAR), the IN, the 2A, or the 2N, depending on their position in the debate.

Because the 2nd speaker (2A or 2N) gives the last speech, they're generally considered to be the “expert” for their side. Most teams have one partner give the 2A and the other partner give the 2N, so that each debater can focus on becoming an expert on one side of the debate.

For more information on speech order and responsibilities, read on, or check out pages 8 and 9 of the Policy Debate Manual at <http://atlantadebate.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/AUDL-2k8-Policy-Debate-Manual-ver-1.1.pdf>

The Constructive Speeches

Why have constructives?

At the end of the debate, the judge makes a decision based on which of the final speeches are more persuasive: the 2NR and the 2AR. So you might ask: if only the last two speeches matter, why have the other six? There are at least three answers to this question.

First, for an argument to be made in the 2NR or 2AR, it must have been present in the previous speeches (judges will discount 2NR or 2AR arguments that are “new.”)

Second, the constructives are an opportunity to read evidence that can then be referenced in later speeches. While it isn't always necessary to cite evidence, doing so can often increase the credibility of your arguments.

Third, debaters can use the constructives to make a wide variety of arguments. To understand why this is valuable, consider the different approaches of two hypothetical affirmative teams: Team Horford and Team LeBron.

In the 2AC, Team Horford makes six arguments against the disadvantage. The negative answers four of these arguments very well, but answers two of the arguments poorly. In the rebuttals, Team Rondo takes advantage of this mistake by only talking about the arguments that were answered poorly.

In the 2AC, Team LeBron makes two arguments against the disadvantage. Because the negative has less arguments to worry about, they answer both very well; and since only two arguments were made in the 2AC, Team LeBron is only able to talk about these two arguments in the rebuttals.

Team Rondo and Team LeBron may end up talking about the same two arguments in the 2AR, but because Team Rondo made diverse arguments in the constructives, they've put the negative in a more difficult position, and their 2AR arguments are likely to be much more persuasive to the judge.

Roles of debaters during constructive speeches

The IAC

The primary job of the IAC is to read the entire affirmative case. That means reading the plan, harms, inherency, and solvency in your first speech. This also includes having the first speech highlighted so you know what and where to read.

The INC

Read all off-case positions and make arguments directly against the case (the affirmative read in the IAC). All parts of every off-case positions should be read. For example- If you are reading the terrorism DA you should read the uniqueness, link, (internal link if applicable) and impact. The INC should have analytical arguments (arguments without cards) for the case debate and should have highlighted all off case positions. The INC sets the format for how arguments will be addressed on the case. For example- the INC makes 1 argument that says Derrick Rose is not a top five player because he does not average 30 points per game. The 2AC will reference that argument first before making their own arguments (off INC #1: etc etc etc)

The 2AC

The 2AC's job begins before the debate. All 2AC's should have some prepared speeches against commonly heard arguments both on and off case. This is called a block or writing blocks. (see the section "how to write a block") The 2AC sets the structure for how arguments are for off case positions. For example the 2NC will say off 2AC #1 when respond to arguments. Offer point by point refutation of your opponent's arguments (line by line debating).

The 2NC

The 2NC extend your teams arguments made in the 1NC. You should be making 1 to 2 point answers to your opponent's arguments they made in the 2AC. You can use the 3 point style of referencing arguments (they said, we said, why we win). For example (off 2AC #1 Derrick Rose won an MVP award. 1st- That was a long time ago and 2nd- he hasn't played a full season in years the top NBA players don't miss time). The 2NC should have prepared blocks to the most common types of affirmative arguments. 2NC's should also point out any and all dropped arguments extend them and tell the judge why this means they win this part of the debate. (For example- They have conceded that terrorism is on the rise therefore we only have to win that our impact is true to win the debate.)

The Rebuttal Speeches

Debating is Clashing

What's the difference between *giving a speech* and *debating*? Giving a speech is mostly about building a relationship between you and your audience: being likable, clear, and persuasive to the person or people who you're speaking to. Debate's about that, too, but it also adds a third term: the other team. Good debaters engage with, or “clash,” with what the other team says.

In day-to-day life “clash” is often viewed as a bad thing: directly criticizing another person's ideas can seem rude or inconsiderate. In debate, though – where both sides usually have an okay point – clash is better viewed as a sign of respect. Clashing with another team's argument means that you've listened to it, understood it, and made an attempt to respond to it. For example, consider two ways for a negative team to make the argument that surveillance is necessary to stop terrorism:

1. “If you vote for the affirmative, terrorists are going to attack the United States. Do you want another 9/11? The affirmative is basically letting Americans die. Why would you make it easier for terrorists to attack us? Surveillance is there to keep us safe, no surveillance, no safety.”

2. “The affirmative says that we need to stop surveillance to preserve liberty. And we can all agree that liberty is important. But what good is liberty if you can't feel safe when you're at work, or getting on the train, or going to the grocery store? If you vote affirmative, it will be much harder for the government to prevent terrorist attacks, and thousands of Americans will be at risk. Liberty is important, but it can't truly exist unless you also have security, which is why you should vote negative to strike the right balance between them.”

The second example, by responding directly to the affirmative's argument about liberty, manages to be more respectful and more effective at the same time.

Clash is important in every speech, but especially in the rebuttal speeches, which are primarily about **extending** your best arguments and comparing them to arguments the other team has made.

Extending arguments

When you make a good argument early in the debate, chances are you'll want to bring it back up again later in the debate. An “extended” argument is an argument made earlier in a debate that's made again in a team's next speech. An argument can be extended from the 1AC to the 2AC, the 2AC to the 1AR, the 1AR to the 2AR, the 1NC to the 2NC/1NR, or the 2NC/1NR to the 2NR.

How is extending an argument different from repeating yourself? **Good extensions contain three elements: an explanation, an impact, and a rebuttal of the other team's arguments.**

Explanations are a summary of a previous argument you've made. The best explanations include both a claim (what is our argument?) and a warrant (how do we know that argument is true?)

The Rebuttal Speeches

“*Impacting*” an argument means explaining how that argument affects the debate as a whole. When impacting an argument, ask yourself: if we're right about this argument, how does it tie back to our central point?

Rebutting the other team's arguments can take several forms. If the other team reads a piece of evidence to answer your piece of evidence, you should compare evidence, either by explaining why your evidence is good or why the other team's evidence is flawed (or, ideally, both). At other points, you may want to argue that the other team's argument or evidence doesn't apply to your original argument.

Here's what a 2NC extension of the Yoo article might look like:

“Extend our Yoo evidence from the INC – the plan encourages terrorist attacks by stopping intelligence agencies from “connecting the dots” necessary to find terrorists. **[explanation]**

This is important because the risk of terrorism is incredibly high, and threatens another 9/11-style catastrophe **[impact]**.

They say that mass surveillance makes it harder to sort through all the innocent people to find terrorists, but Yoo's point is that once we've found a possible terrorist, mass surveillance allows us to sort through the haystack to find other people who are in on the plot. **[rebuttal]**

Impact analysis

“Impact analysis,” also known as “impact comparison,” is the process of comparing reasons why the plan is good with reasons why the plan is bad. For instance, the affirmative might argue that the plan security a right to privacy. At the same time, the negative might argue that the plan would cause terrorism. Which is more important: privacy or stopping terrorism? Since whoever wins this argument will have a big advantage in the debate, impact analysis is a vital part of rebuttals.

There are four general reasons why one impact might be more important than other:

1. *Magnitude* – how big is an impact? This includes both how many people an impact affects and the way in which it affects them.
2. *Risk* – how likely is the impact to occur? Do we know that the impact is going to happen (maybe because it's already happening), or is a hypothetical future problem?
3. *Timeframe* – in how long will the impact occur? Impacts that happen farther into the future may be less likely to occur, since it's often more difficult to make predictions over the long term.
4. *Turns the impact/solves the impact* – how does your impact interact with the other team's impact? For instance: the affirmative might say: “without liberty, prioritizing security is almost pointless, since there's nothing to protect.”

The acronym Mr.T can help you to remember impact analysis: magnitude, risk, and timeframe.

Role of debaters during Rebuttal Speeches

The IAR

The primary jobs of the IAR are to extend the best arguments from the 2AC and to rebut the negative's responses. As the most time pressured speech in the debate, the IAR must quickly and efficiently make a variety of arguments.

The best way to deal with time pressure in the IAR is to narrow the debate wherever possible. On disadvantages and off-case arguments, it isn't necessary to extend more than 1-3 2AC arguments into the IAR. The IAR should answer every negative argument on the advantages they plan to win, but the IAR can choose to "kick" an advantage if they want to save time.

The 2NR

The primary jobs of the 2NR are:

First- "write the ballot for the judge." Writing the ballot for the judge means explaining, in a big-picture way, why you win the debate. One way to force yourself to do this is to start every 2NR with the words "the most important thing in the debate is..." and then to explain which issues the judge should look to first in deciding the debate. Impact analysis is often the best place to direct a judge's attention in the 2NR.

Second- to answer the IAR's arguments. Make sure you not only answer the IAR arguments but also think about what arguments the 2AR could make and answer those arguments too. Below is a brief example of what a 2NR would look like say on the Terrorism DA.

2NR EXAMPLE:

Terrorism is "the most important thing in the debate". It outweighs the affirmative on magnitude....A nuclear terrorist attack would kill millions and possibly risk extinction. The affirmative claims that the biggest impact is a reduction in rights. You can't use your rights if you do not exist. Also, if a terrorist attack happens rights will be crack down even further thus out DA solves any reduction of rights.

Now, the line by line debate- The IAR says there is no link. First extend the Yoo evidence NSA mass surveillance is key to finding terrorist. Terrorist communicate via the internet and phone if we can deter that we can stop most terrorist attacks you're never heard of. The Aff ends mass surveillance how can they not link?

Lastly, they will say that affirming human rights matters. But if human rights matter what's a worse human rights infraction... letting terrorist kill innocent civilians or limiting some privacy that no one will notice unless they are engaging in terrorist activities.

The 2AR

As in the 2NR, the 2AR should attempt to "write the ballot for the judge." The 2AR should start by explaining the most important issues in the debate and then proceed to explaining other important arguments and answering 2NR arguments.

How to write a block and why?

What are blocks? Are they really, really, really important?

To answer the second question: yes, blocks are really, really really, important.

To answer the first question: blocks are pre-written and pre-organized responses to common arguments. Since there are only a few big arguments in the packet, you'll be debating the same arguments again and again: and since you'll be debating the same arguments again and again, it's important to think through how you'll respond to them.

Good blocks include both evidence from articles and analytical arguments. For instance: a INC block against the right to privacy advantage in the SSRA aff might include evidence from two articles in the packet, along with several analytical arguments that you come up with on your own. Similarly, a 2AC block against the Terrorism disadvantage might include several articles and several analytics.

Once a block is written, you can use it in every debate where you face a given argument. Every time the INC reads a Terrorism disadvantage, you can read your 2AC Terrorism block in response. This saves preparation time in the debate, ensures that you know your arguments well, and gives you time to choose the best arguments against the disadvantage.

Blocks are most important for the INC and 2AC, but you can make blocks for any speech other than the IAC. For instance, there are only so many possible affirmative answers to the Economy disadvantage, so it's reasonable to write out a 2NC/INR block to each in advance to each argument.

Finally, blocks can make it easy to adapt and improve your arguments based on experience and judge commentary. If a judge has a comment about a particular argument you made, it's easy to adjust that argument in the block so that it can be made more effectively in future debates.

What would a block look like?

Let's say the IAC argues that schools should devote more time and resources to gym class, because more time in gym would improve students' health. The INC responds with a Math Disadvantage that says that more gym class would trade off with time in math class, decreasing how much students learn.

On the next page, there's a sample 2AC block that could be used to respond to the disadvantage. Then, any time the affirmative team hears the Math Disadvantage, they can pull out their block and immediately have access to their best arguments. Later, if they think of new or better arguments, they can add them to the block in the future.

Sample 2AC block- Math Block

Here let's assume that the negative has made an argument that Math class is more important Health class below is a 2AC block to that argument.

Sample 2AC block

1. Our advantage is more important than their disadvantage, because better health means that students live longer and better lives.

2. You have to be healthy before you can learn – more gym class means that students will do more with the limited time they have in math class. They'll have more of an opportunity to clear their minds and more energy in general.

3. Quality over quantity – high-quality math instruction is far more impactful than just spending a few more minutes in class. According to Elena Silver, a senior policy analyst at Education Sector, “Research reveals a complicated relationship between time and learning and suggests that improving the quality of instructional time is at least as important as increasing the quantity of time in school.” They haven't proven that there's any relationship between spending more time in class and students performing better in math.

4. Math's boring, anyway. Who uses that stuff in the real world?

5. [More arguments, or evidence]

6. [More arguments, or evidence]

Now let's write a 2NC block to one of the arguments.

Sample 2NC block

AT: 2AC- Math is boring

AT (meaning answer to): 2AC- Math is boring (so at the top of the page write this so you know what you are answering)

1. Math is not boring. It is the cornerstone of our economy if we cannot do math we can never properly balance budgets and then we'd run out of money.

2. Math is fun. You can play games on your laptop, computer, or phone. Trivia games on facebook about math prove this is true.

See that easy!!

Judge Adaptation

Some of your judges may have coached debate for many years, or debated themselves in high school or college. Other judges may be at their first-ever debate tournament. Still other judges may have been judging debates casually for several months, but never coached or participated in the activity themselves.

Whatever judge you have, it's up to you to make your case in a way that's persuasive to them.

Keep in mind that everyone has different ideas about what counts as a good or bad argument. As a debater, your goal isn't to make the argument that's most persuasive to *you* (although believing that your arguments are good ones is important). The real goal is to make the argument that's most persuasive to your *audience*: in this case, your judge.

Here's a few ideas for adapting to your judge:

1. Talk to your judge. Before the debate, it's fine to ask the judge how much experience they have with debate, and if they have any strong feelings about what you do or shouldn't or do in-round. Most judges will be happy to answer you: you're demonstrating that you respect their time, and that you want to debate in a way they'll enjoy.

2. Watch your judge. Some judges will smile, frown, nod or shake their head, look bored or engaged, or give you other non-verbal signals that they like or don't like the argument you're making. If it seems like they like your argument – remember to watch the judge and have your partner watch the judge to see what they like and dislike. Focus on that argument in later speeches, and you'll have a good chance to win the debate. If it seems like they don't like your argument, it's not a big deal – now you can be pretty sure that particular argument won't win you the debate, and you can move onto another argument that might be more effective.

3. Work on your argument skills and your speaking skills. All judges appreciate a good, logical argument, and all judges appreciate polished speaking skills. How much they care about each, though, might depend on their approach to the activity. The easiest solution is to get good at both: otherwise, you'll find yourself able to win debates only in front of certain kinds of judges.

4. Be respectful to your opponents. Again, all judges want this, but some might care so much about it that they'll decide the debate on that alone. As in the rest of life,

5. Ask how you can do better. After the debate, ask the judge what you could work on for next time. Whether you won or lost, chances are that your judge will have some ideas on how you can improve. And, if you end up debating in front of that judge again, you can keep their comments in mind to build a case that's uniquely appealing to them.

Cutting Cards

Why do we care about cards?

We're not experts! When we have experts supporting our claims we look more creditable... You can talk about why they are creditable and why your opponent's cards are not creditable... It gives us a way to have different forms of clash and adds to the clash that already exists.

So what makes a card good???

3 things are needed to make a card a good card

1st- It must have good warrants. It should explain why your claims are true. It can do this either with empirical evidence (historical reasons) or logical reason (A is correct because of B and B is correct because of C etc etc) If the reason is logical then the card should go into detail about why. It can give statistical reasons for example – global warming is real because the top 100 scientist have don't over 100 years of analysis determine that the earth is warming at an accelerated rate.

2nd- The qualifications of the author must be good. If you find the greatest nuclear war impact card ever and its written by James Smith 3rd grade dropout and future alien test subject this person is probably not creditable enough to be talk about the effects of nuclear war. Make sure the person talking about the truth claims are creditable. Wikipedia is NOT a credible source it may not be peer reviewed instead use it to find the work referenced on the page.

3rd- date of publication- If your argument is time sensitive then having the most up to date information is very important. If you are running terrorism DA and you are using a uniqueness card from the 90's that isn't as good as a card from this month.

So what makes a bad card????

So there are a couple of things we can try to avoid

1st- try to avoid cards that say "sometimes," "occasionally," "can," "might," "it is conceivable that..." and "has the potential to..."

2nd- power tagging or over-tagging your cards- if your tag has more words that you read in the card... it is not a good card.

3rd- it is out of context- meaning that's not what the author intended to say. If you only use the part of the card that supports what you want to say but ignore where she says "however, I disagree with the above argument." That is taking the card out of context and it should not be done.

There are 3 parts to an evidence card:

- 1) The Tag/Claim—a brief statement summarizing the point of the evidence. The tag must be a complete idea (subject and verb). You write the tag after reading the evidence. (see “Evidence Citations” below).
- 2) The source citation (see “Tags” below)
- 3) The exact passage as copied from the article (cut and paste) and placed in a document to be copied and shared. (see “Handing in Your Evidence” below)

Sample Card

Offshore wind is too expensive and won't work – the Netherlands have already tried the plan and failed-TAG

Nelson, I I (D. Brady Nelson, an economist, writing for The Heartland Institute, a think tank advocating for free markets. Published December 30, 2011. Available at <http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2011/12/30/dutch-pull-plug-offshore-wind-subsidies>)- CITATION

The nation known for its iconic windmills is throwing in the towel on offshore wind power, as Dutch officials have determined the Netherlands can no longer afford large-scale subsidies for expensive wind turbines that cannot produce electricity at economically competitive prices.

The decision is a powerful blow against renewable power advocates who have long asserted Holland proves renewable power can be practical and economical. PASSAGE

Using Articles

Reading, understanding, and deploying the articles in this packet is probably the single most important thing you can do to win debates. The articles are drawn from many different perspectives on surveillance, and make a variety of arguments on both sides. If you ever think to yourself: "how do I answer this argument?" - there's a pretty good chance you'll be able to find the answer in one of the affirmative or negative articles. The articles also allow you to use evidence to support your claims, which – when used effectively – can make your arguments much more credible than the other team's arguments.

More Resources

Articles

America's "Big Brother": A Century of U.S. Domestic Surveillance by DAVID P. HADLEY-
<http://origins.osu.edu/article/americas-big-brother-century-us-domestic-surveillance>

The Electronic Frontier Foundation- <https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/timeline>

Books

No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State
By Glenn Greenwald

Videos

Practice Debate on this year's topic
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ld6Ga6DCnP0>

Chomsky on Snowden & Why NSA Surveillance Doesn't Stop Terror While the U.S. Drone War Creates It (4:53)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-gjxVwyjgg>

Glenn Greenwald VS Alan Dershowitz (2014) "State Surveillance" (1:33:37)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QWuCIWLKurg>

*****Sample IAC and INC*****



How To Use This Section

What's in this Section?

This section contains:

A pre-written IAC (the Surveillance State Repeal Act)

A pre-written INC disadvantage (the terrorism disadvantage)

And one pre-written INC answer to the privacy advantage (surveillance doesn't threaten our rights)

Each of these arguments are drawn exclusively from the articles later in the packet: the only difference is that they're organized and converted into a "card" form.

The arguments in this section can win debates, but over the long term, they'll lose to arguments drawn from the articles in the packet. You'll need all of those articles in order to fully answer the disadvantage, read different advantages and disadvantages, and support the basic arguments found here. As the year goes on, you should write your own IACs and INCs based on the articles as well as using them to support arguments in the 2AC and 2NC.

The Affirmative

The affirmative plan is for the Congress to enact the Surveillance State Repeal Act, which makes it illegal for the National Security Agency (NSA) to engage in mass surveillance on Americans' phone records and internet communications. The advantage is privacy rights: the affirmative argues that privacy is a basic human right. The Valeri evidence argues that a right to private communication is important to the basic fabric of a free society, since people who are monitored will be afraid to express their true thoughts and exercise democratic rights.

The Terrorism Disadvantage

The economy disadvantage argues that the affirmative plan will make it easier for terrorists to attack the United States. The Fleitz evidence claims that current laws give the NSA enough authority to prevent terrorist attacks, and the Yoo evidence argues that the affirmative plan will prevent the NSA from "connecting the dots" to find terrorists and their associates. The Kaplan evidence impacts this by arguing that ISIS' victories in the Middle East make a terrorist attack on the U.S. likely, and that such an attack could be as destructive as 9/11.

Glossary

Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act

Section 702 permits the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to jointly authorize targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, but is limited to targeting non-U.S. persons. Once authorized, such acquisitions may last for periods of up to one year.

Under subsection 702(b) of the FISA Amendments Act, such an acquisition is also subject to several limitations. Specifically, an acquisition:

May not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States;
May not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States;

May not intentionally target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
May not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States;

Must be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[9]

Section 215 of the Patriot Act

The NSA used Section 215 of the Patriot Act as the basis for collecting phone records of Americans who were not necessarily under official investigation. It was also used to track financial data and to obtain companies' internet business records. The extent of the mass surveillance program was revealed nearly two years ago by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden

Patriot Act

The USA Patriot Act is an antiterrorism law enacted by the U.S. Congress in October 2001, at the request of then-President George W. Bush in response to the terrorist attacks that took place on Sept. 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, D.C. Often referred to simply as the Patriot Act, it was signed by Bush on Oct. 26, 2001.

The law gave new powers to the U.S. Department of Justice, the National Security Agency and other federal agencies on domestic and international surveillance of electronic communications; it also removed legal barriers that had blocked law enforcement, intelligence and defense agencies from sharing information about potential terrorist threats and coordinating efforts to respond to them. But the Patriot Act raised concerns among civil liberties groups and other critics surrounding the data privacy rights of U.S. citizens -- concerns that were heightened significantly in 2013, when NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked information showing that the agency was using the law to justify the bulk collection of data about millions of phone calls.

Surveillance State Repeal Act

The bill would completely repeal the PATRIOT Act as well as the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, which permits the NSA to collect Internet communications — a program exposed by former NSA contractor-turned-whistleblower Edward Snowden. The bill would reform the court that oversees the nation's spying powers, enhance protections for whistleblowers, and stop the government from forcing technology companies to create easy access into their devices.

Mass surveillance

Is the intricate surveillance of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population. The surveillance is often carried out by governments or governmental organizations, but may also be carried out by corporations,

either on behalf of governments or at their own initiative.

Targeted surveillance

Targeted surveillance is surveillance directed at particular individuals and can involve the use of specific powers by authorized public agencies. Targeted surveillance can be carried out overtly or covertly, and can involve human agents. Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), targeted covert surveillance is "directed" if it is carried out for a specific investigation or operation. By comparison, if it is carried out on designated premises or on a vehicle, it is "intrusive" surveillance. Targeting methods include the interception of communications, the use of communications "traffic" data, visual surveillance devices, and devices that sense movement, objects or persons.

FISA Amendments Act of 2008

The act provides critically important authority for the U.S. Intelligence Community to acquire foreign intelligence information by targeting foreign persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States. It ensures that the Intelligence Community has the flexibility and agility it needs to identify and respond to terrorist and other foreign threats to our security.

National Security Agency also known as NSA

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is home to America's codemakers and codebreakers. The National Security Agency has provided timely information to U.S. decision makers and military leaders for more than half a century. The Central Security Service was established in 1972 to promote a full partnership between NSA and the cryptologic elements of the armed forces.

Human Rights

Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.

Universal human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law lays down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.

Electronic Communication Privacy Act

Background- The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Wire Electronic Communications Act are commonly referred together as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. The ECPA updated the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, which addressed interception of conversations using "hard" telephone lines, but did not apply to interception of computer and other digital and electronic communications. Several subsequent pieces of legislation, including The USA PATRIOT Act, clarify and update the ECPA to keep pace with the evolution of new communications technologies and methods, including easing restrictions on law enforcement access to stored communications in some cases.

General Provisions- The ECPA, as amended, protects wire, oral, and electronic communications while those communications are being made, are in transit, and when they are stored on computers. The Act applies to email, telephone conversations, and data stored electronically.

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties- "The structure of the SCA reflects a series of classifications that indicate

2015 Atlanta Urban Debate League

Starter Evidence Packet (SSRA Affirmative and Terrorism Disadvantage)

the drafters' judgments about what kinds of information implicate greater or lesser privacy interests. For example, the drafters saw greater privacy interests in the content of stored emails than in subscriber account information. Similarly, the drafters believed that computing services available 'to the public' required more strict [sic] regulation than services not available to the public... To protect the array of privacy interests identified by its drafters, the [Act] offers varying degrees of legal protection depending on the perceived importance of the privacy interest involved. Some information can be obtained from providers with a subpoena; other information requires a special court order; and still other information requires a search warrant. In addition, some types of legal process require notice to the subscriber, while other types do not."

Metadata

Surveillance metadata is usually associated with electronic communication channels, such as phone, email and social media. Data is collected through wiretapping and other electronic surveillance methods, including government Trojans, wiretap Trojans and keyloggers. Simply put, metadata is the digital information that accompanies electronic communication. When you make a mobile phone call, your provider records the time, date, location, and duration of this call, largely for billing purposes.

Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism is a political system in which the state holds total authority over the society and seeks to control all aspects of public and private life wherever possible.

Tyranny

Cruel and oppressive government or rule.

Sample IAC

Contention 1 is Plan-

Due to harms associated with NSA surveillance my partner and I propose the following plan:

The United States Congress should enact the Surveillance State Repeal Act.

Contention 2 is Inherency -

The U.S. National Security Agency, or NSA, engages in mass surveillance of Americans' phone records and Internet activity

ProPublica, 13 (Independent, non-profit newsroom that produces investigative journalism in the public interest. "FAQ: What You Need to Know About the NSA's Surveillance Programs," 6-27-13. <http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collection-faq>)

We don't know all of the different types of information the NSA collects, but several secret collection programs have been revealed:

A record of most calls made in the U.S., including the telephone number of the phones making and receiving the call, and how long the call lasted. This information is known as "metadata" and doesn't include a recording of the actual call (but see below). This program was revealed through a leaked secret court order instructing Verizon to turn over all such information on a daily basis. Other phone companies, including AT&T and Sprint, also reportedly give their records to the NSA on a continual basis. All together, this is several billion calls per day.

Email, Facebook posts and instant messages for an unknown number of people, via PRISM, which involves the cooperation of at least nine different technology companies. Google, Facebook, Yahoo and others have denied that the NSA has "direct access" to their servers, saying they only release user information in response to a court order. Facebook has revealed that, in the last six months of 2012, they handed over the private data of between 18,000 and 19,000 users to law enforcement of all types -- including local police and federal agencies, such as the FBI, Federal Marshals and the NSA.

Massive amounts of raw Internet traffic The NSA intercepts huge amounts of raw data, and stores billions of communication records per day in its databases. Using the NSA's XKEYSCORE software, analysts can see "nearly everything a user does on the Internet" including emails, social media posts, web sites you visit, addresses typed into Google Maps, files sent, and more. Currently the NSA is only authorized to intercept Internet communications with at least one end outside the U.S., though the domestic collection program used to be broader. But because there is no fully reliable automatic way to separate domestic from international communications, this program also captures some amount of U.S. citizens' purely domestic Internet activity, such as emails, social media posts, instant messages, the sites you visit and online purchases you make...

It's important to note that the NSA probably has information about you even if you aren't on this target list. If you have previously communicated with someone who has been targeted, then the NSA already has the content of any emails, instant messages, phone calls, etc. you exchanged with the targeted person. Also, your data is likely in bulk records such as phone metadata and Internet traffic recordings. This is what makes these programs "mass surveillance," as opposed to traditional wiretaps, which are authorized by individual, specific court orders.

Contention 3 is our Advantage – Right To Privacy

Government surveillance violates human rights and undermines free societies – it stifles creativity, free expression, and trust between people

Valeri, I3 (Andy, M.A. Interdisciplinary Studies, adjunct at the School of Advertising Art, founder of UnCommon Sense TVMedia. "Communication, Human Rights, and The Threat of Weapons of Mass Surveillance: Why Communication Rights Are Essential To the Protection and Advancement of Human Rights in the 21st Century." Paper presented at the conference on The Social Practice of Human Rights: Charting the Frontiers of Research and Advocacy University of Dayton, October 3-5, 2013. http://ecommons.udayton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=human_rights)

The rapidly expanding and indiscriminate use of these weapons of mass surveillance is destroying the intrinsic capacity for human beings to communicate and to share information in ways [consistent] with our fundamental human rights to privacy, information, and communication. It threatens our ability to maintain our personal dignity and authenticity as human beings, by degrading our right and ability to define and control the meaning and purpose of the lives we live, and the relationships we engage with among each other...

Under the auspices of fighting a seemingly perpetual war against an ever-present threat of 'terrorism,' the Internet has become the active terrain of war, and is considered a battleground, part of the "operational domain" of the military (Alexander, 2011). And battlegrounds are the least hospitable of environments for the provision and the protection of human rights and the rule of law (Human Rights and Conflicts, n.d.). The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), with no legal mandate, and beyond the bounds of American constitutional and international human rights law, has made it its own explicit policy to collect and monitor every single form of electronic communication on the planet (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013). Or, as in the words of NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander, to "collect it all" (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013), mirroring the official motto of the Stasi, the infamous secret police force of the former East Germany - "To Know Everything."

Perhaps even more disconcerting are the demonstrable effects that persistent surveillance has on the psychological well being of individuals and societies. Studies have detailed the many distorting impacts that it has on how we think and act (Parramore, 2013). Some have shown that the electronic monitoring of employees increases the levels of tension, anxiety, anger, depression, even boredom and fatigue among workers (Smith, Carayon, Sanders, Lim & LeGrande, 1992)... studies show that, regardless of the amount of official censorship present, the shifting of "social norms" in respect to privacy expectations has a marked impact on our willingness "to confide, to criticize, to make mistakes, to change our minds" (Kendzior, 2012).

The detrimental societal effects of this kind self-censorship were well-documented by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974) in her groundbreaking research on what she termed "the spiral of silence." We see its effects in the "perception falsification" that takes place when people fail to express their real thoughts or preferences out of fear of failing to conform to social or political norms (Ars Electronica, 2011). Czech writer, dissident, and later president Václav Havel, argued that the credibility of the entire structure of society itself is eroded by its reliance upon rituals and norms "untested by public discussion and controversy" (Keane, 2000).

When it comes to the destructive effects wrought by mass surveillance, there is probably no more brutal example than that of Ceausescu's Rumania, where truly every action observable would be reported to the secret police (Duque, 2011). In such a society, deliberate deception becomes the key to survival, a trait which quickly bleeds into all other human relations; personal, family, commercial, etc. The true cost of surveillance thus becomes the destruction of society itself (Duque, 2011).

The status quo is ill-equipped to deal with the assaults on privacy. We must understand that privacy is indispensable and critical to the preservation our society. Privacy is the most important impact in the round.

Sadowski, 13 (*Jathan*, 2/26, *studies applied ethics and the human and social dimensions of science and technology at Arizona State University*. <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/why-does-privacy-matter-one-scholars-answer/273521/>)

Our privacy is now at risk in unprecedented ways, but, sadly, the legal system is lagging behind the pace of innovation. Indeed, the last major privacy law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, was passed in 1986! While an update to the law -- spurred on by the General Petraeus scandal -- is in the works, it only aims to add some more protection to electronic communication like emails. This still does not shield our privacy from other, possibly nefarious, ways that our data can be collected and put to use. Some legislators would much rather not have legal restrictions that could, as Rep. Marsha Blackburn stated in an op-ed, "threaten the lifeblood of the Internet: data." Consider Rep. Blackburn's remarks during an April 2010 Congressional hearing: "[A]nd what happens when you follow the European privacy model and take information out of the information economy? ... Revenues fall, innovation stalls and you lose out to innovators who choose to work elsewhere."

Even though the practices of many companies such as Facebook are legal, there is something disconcerting about them. Privacy should have a deeper purpose than the one ascribed to it by those who treat it as a currency to be traded for innovation, which in many circumstances seems to actually mean corporate interests. To protect our privacy, we need a better understanding of its purpose and why it is valuable.

That's where Georgetown University law professor Julie E. Cohen comes in. In a forthcoming article for the Harvard Law Review, she lays out a strong argument that addresses the titular concern "What Privacy Is For." Her approach is fresh, and as technology critic Evgeny Morozov rightly tweeted, she wrote "the best paper on privacy theory you'll get to read this year." (He was referring to 2012.)

At bottom, Cohen's argument criticizes the dominant position held by theorists and legislators who treat privacy as just an instrument used to advance some other principle or value, such as liberty, inaccessibility, or control. Framed this way, privacy is relegated to one of many defenses we have from things like another person's prying eyes, or Facebook's recent attempts to ramp up its use of facial-recognition software and collect further data about us without our explicit consent. As long as the principle in question can be protected through some other method, or if privacy gets in the way of a different desirable goal like innovation, it is no longer useful and can be disregarded. Cohen doesn't think we should treat privacy as a dispensable instrument. To the contrary, she argues privacy is irreducible to a "fixed condition or attribute (such as seclusion or control) whose boundaries can be crisply delineated by the application of deductive logic. Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the process of ... self-development." What Cohen means is that since life and contexts are always changing, privacy cannot be reductively conceived as one specific type of thing. It is better understood as an important buffer that gives us space to develop an identity that is somewhat separate from the surveillance, judgment, and values of our society and culture. Privacy is crucial for helping us manage all of these pressures -- pressures that shape the type of person we are -- and for "creating spaces for play and the work of self-[development]." Cohen argues that this self-development allows us to discover what type of society we want and what we should do to get there, both factors that are key to living a fulfilled life.

Contention 4 is Solvency -

The SSRA prohibits warrantless surveillance of Americans and protects the right to privacy Clabough, 15 (Raven, writer for The New American, M.A. University of Albany. "House Members Target Patriot Act with "Surveillance State Repeal Act," 3-31-15. <http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/20560-house-members-target-patriot-act-with-surveillance-state-repeal-act>)

U.S. Representatives Mark Pocan (D-Wis., photo on left) and Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), who are seeking to repeal the PATRIOT Act in its entirety and combat any legal provisions that amount to American spying, unveiled their Surveillance State Repeal Act on Tuesday.

"This isn't just tinkering around the edges," Pocan said during a Capitol Hill briefing on the legislation. "This is a meaningful overhaul of the system, getting rid of essentially all parameters of the PATRIOT Act."

"The PATRIOT Act contains many provisions that violate the Fourth Amendment and have led to a dramatic expansion of our domestic surveillance state," added Massie (R-Ky.), who co-authored the legislation with Pocan. "Our Founding Fathers fought and died to stop the kind of warrantless spying and searches that the PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act authorize. It is long past time to repeal the PATRIOT Act and reassert the constitutional rights of all Americans."

The House bill would completely repeal the PATRIOT Act, passed in the days following the 9/11 attacks, as well as the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, which permits the NSA to collect Internet communications — a program exposed by former NSA contractor-turned-whistleblower Edward Snowden.

Likewise, the bill would reform the court that oversees the nation's spying powers, enhance protections for whistleblowers, and stop the government from forcing technology companies to create easy access into their devices.

"The warrantless collection of millions of personal communications from innocent Americans is a direct violation of our constitutional right to privacy," declared Congressman Pocan, adding,

"Revelations about the NSA's programs reveal the extraordinary extent to which the program has invaded Americans' privacy. I reject the notion that we must sacrifice liberty for security. We can live in a secure nation which also upholds a strong commitment to civil liberties."

Sample INC Disadvantage

Uniqueness – current NSA surveillance is preventing terrorist attacks on the United States

Fleitz, I5 (Fred, senior vice president for policy and programs for the Center for Security Policy. He worked in national-security positions for 25 years with the CIA, the State Department, and the House Intelligence Committee. “NSA Data Collection: Necessary, or Unconstitutional?” 5-11-15. <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418207/nsa-data-collection-necessary-or-unconstitutional-fred-fleitz>)

Although the Obama administration refuses to say that the attempted massacre by two heavily armed assailants at a “draw Mohammed” contest in Garland, Texas, was an act of terrorism directed by ISIS, there is little doubt this was the case. One of the heavily armed attackers had been in touch through Twitter with jihadists in Australia and Somalia who were associated with ISIS and who had called for attacks on the Garland event. ISIS also seemed to know about the attack in advance and immediately claimed responsibility for it. Pamela Geller, the organizer of the “draw Mohammed” contest, wrote this week that whether ISIS leaders actually directed the attack or only had foreknowledge of it is a distinction without a difference, since ISIS has called for attacks on the United States and published manuals explaining how homegrown Islamist terrorists can construct bombs and kill infidels...

This is why Senator Mitch McConnell recently introduced a “clean” — that is, with no changes at all — reauthorization of the Patriot Act, which extends three of its provisions on electronic-surveillance programs used to protect our country against terrorist attacks. The most controversial is the NSA metadata program enacted in Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Opponents of the 215 program claim it is an unconstitutional violation of privacy rights and say that it has played no role in protecting the United States from terrorist attacks. Both of these claims are untrue. Under the metadata program, the NSA collects large numbers of phone records — not the contents of phone calls — and uses them to make connections between terror suspects. The program is subject to strong oversight by the executive branch, Congress, and the courts and is used only for national-security investigations. Only 22 people at the NSA are allowed access to these metadata, and they are barred from any data-mining, even in connection with an investigation. While its detractors refuse to admit it, the 215 program has been a successful tool in stopping terrorist attacks. It has been strongly defended by many intelligence officials and members of Congress, including Senator Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.), vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who said during a January 14, 2014, Judiciary Committee hearing that this program had helped stop terrorist plots to bomb the New York City subways, the New York stock exchange, and a Danish newspaper.

Link – NSA mass surveillance is necessary to identify and stop terrorism – without sorting through some innocent communications, it's impossible to find terrorists

Yoo, 06 (John, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, current law professor at UC Berkeley, most well-known for writing the Bush administration's legal justification for torture. “The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 1-1-06. <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=facpubs>)

An intelligence search conducted today, as Judge Richard Posner has described it, “is a search for a needle in a haystack.” Rather than focus on foreign agents who are already known, counter-terrorism agencies must search for clues among millions of potentially innocent connections, communications, and links. “The intelligence services,” Posner writes, “must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the clues that may enable the next attack to be prevented.”⁶ Our best information about al Qaeda will be scattered and tough to gather, and our agents must be able to follow many leads quickly and move fast on hunches and educated guesses. Members of the al Qaeda network can be detected, with good intelligence work or luck, by examining phone and e-mail communications, as well as evidence of joint travel, shared assets, common histories or families, meetings, and so on.⁶⁶ As the time for an attack nears, “chatter” on this network will increase as al Qaeda operatives communicate to coordinate plans, move and position assets, and conduct target reconnaissance.⁶⁷ When our intelligence agents successfully locate or capture an al Qaeda member, they must be able to move quickly to connect new information to other operatives before news of the capture causes these operatives to disappear. It is more important to chase them down quickly inside the United States than outside. Incredibly, critics want to place bureaucratic impediments precisely at this juncture,

where the danger to America is greatest.

Take the example of the 9/11 hijackers. Since the attack, links suggested by commercially available data have shown ties between every single one of the al Qaeda plotters and Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawar al Hazmi, the two hijackers known to the CIA in the summer of 2001 to have been in the country.⁶⁹ Mihdhar and Hazmi had rented apartments in their own name and were listed in the San Diego phone book.⁷⁰ Both Mohammad Atta, the leader of the 9/11 al Qaeda cell, and Marwan al-Shehi, who piloted one of planes into the World Trade Center, had lived with them.⁷¹ Hijacker Majed Moqed used the same frequent flier number as Hazmi. Five hijackers used the same phone number as Atta when booking their flights.⁷² The remaining hijackers shared addresses or phone numbers with Ahmed Alghamdi, a hijacker who was in the United States in violation of his visa at the time.⁷³

Our intelligence agents, in fact, had strong leads that could conceivably have led them to all the hijackers before 9/11 had they located some of the operatives through intercepted communications.

Impact – terrorism is likely and risks another 9/11-style attack on America

Kaplan, 14 (Rebecca, political reporter for CBS News. "Will ISIS plan a 9/11-style terror plot against the U.S.?" 6-16-14. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-isis-plan-a-911-style-terror-plot-against-the-u-s/>)

As the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - which has already captured the cities of Tikrit and Mosul and is threatening to take the capital city as well - grows in strength and numbers, will it pose an immediate threat to the United States homeland as well?

Experts say the group's increasing power and reach is concerning, though it's not entirely clear when they might be able to threaten the U.S.

"You've got motivation mixed with opportunity, ideology and foreign fighters and all of that looks like a very extreme version of Afghanistan in the '90s, plus what was happening in Iraq after the Iraq war," said CBS News National Security Analyst Juan Zarate. "This is a cauldron of future terrorist threats to the west."

The bigger danger, Zarate said, is that the U.S. does not yet know exactly what the group will look like once it evolves. While ISIS might not launch an attack on U.S. soil tomorrow, he said, "I think the grave threat here is that you have the seeds of a new terrorist movement emerging very aggressively."

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said on CBS' "Face the Nation" Sunday that U.S. officials have warned the next major attack on U.S. soil could emanate from the region.

"The seeds of 9/11s are being planted all over Iraq and Syria," Graham said. "They want an Islamic caliphate that runs through Syria and Iraq...and they plan to drive us out of the Mideast by attacking us here at home."

Zarate warned about the influence of senior al Qaeda figures who traveled to Syria and could be working to turn ISIS' attention toward the west.

"You do have very senior al Qaeda figures who have migrated to the Syrian conflict to provide strategic guidance and direction and to me that's incredibly dangerous because you have operatives and strategists who have had squarely in mind to turn the attention of these groups toward the west," he said.

One of Rogers' principal concerns is the threat posed by American and European fighters who traveled to what he called "jihadist Disneyland" in eastern Syria and have been radicalized. Just last month, a U.S. citizen linked to al Qaeda terrorists carried out a suicide bombing in Syria.

ISIS "is an al Qaeda-inspired group that certainly has al Qaeda ties, that now has the capability to tap people with Western passports to send them back to Europe and the United States for terrorist activity. That's a problem for us," Rogers said.

Sample INC Answer to Privacy Rights Advantage

Surveillance doesn't threaten individual rights in a democracy

Lane, 13 (Charles, editorial writer, specializing in economic policy, federal fiscal issues and business, and a contributor to the PostPartisan blog. In 2009 he was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in Editorial Writing. Op-ed in the Washington Post, 7-15-13. "NSA Surveillance is Within Democracy's Bounds." http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-lane-nsa-surveillance-is-within-democracys-bounds/2013/07/15/d509b1ae-ed8a-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html)

The methods of surveillance and intelligence gathering — bribery, blackmail, wiretapping, infiltration and the rest — are not normal tools of democratic governance. To the contrary: There is a basic tension, or trade-off, between democracy and secrecy, and it's absurd to deny it.

Yet it is equally absurd to suggest, as Jakob Augstein did in Der Spiegel, that "no matter in what system or to what purpose: A monitored human being is not a free human being."

The political goals and institutional context of a given state's intelligence-gathering make all the difference. In East Germany, the purpose of surveillance was to protect an unelected party that exercised a monopoly of political and economic power on behalf of a foreign military occupier, the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party's ideology politicized every aspect of life, rendering the pettiest deviations, in word or deed, threatening — and thus subject to secret official scrutiny.

Unchecked by any law, Stasi spying evolved into an end in itself. East Germany really was a "surveillance state."

Despite much rhetoric from Snowden's camp, the United States does not fit that admittedly vague description: No party holds or plausibly aspires to a monopoly on power in this country, with its centuries-old constitutional separation of powers, two-party system, free press, private sector and robust civil society. Many fault the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as a pawn of the NSA, forgetting that it was one of many reforms Americans instituted in the 1970s to correct previous intelligence abuses — and how rare it is for any nation to subject intelligence-gathering to even minimal judicial oversight. Nor does the U.S. government define the normal exercise of freedom as inherently threatening; the terrorists and other threats about which it gathers secret intelligence are not imaginary...

In short, even the most worrisome issues Snowden has raised amount to manageable trade-offs between liberty and security, for both the United States and its allies.

Sample I NC Answer to Solvency

Mass collection of private information is inevitable and doesn't cause material harm

Posner, 13 (Eric, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, is the co-author of "Terror in the Balance" and "The Executive Unbound." "Is the N.S.A. Surveillance Threat Real or Imagined?" 6-9-13.

<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-or-imagined>)

Jameel, I don't see the need for systemic reform, nor do I see an offense to the Constitution. Indeed, **I don't even understand the nature of the objection to the National Security Agency programs. Exactly what harm did they cause?** Two possibilities emerge from the current public discussion.

1. A general sense of creepiness that government officials know when we make phone calls, and for how long, or may even be reading our e-mail messages. Government should not look over our shoulders as we conduct our lives.
2. A fear that the government uses this information to undermine democracy — to blackmail, harass or embarrass critics, for example.

The first objection strikes me as weak. **We already give the government an enormous amount of information about our lives, and seem to have gotten used to the idea that an Internal Revenue Service knows our finances, or that an employee of a government hospital knows our medical history, or that social workers (if we are on welfare) know our relationships with family members, or that public school teachers know about our children's abilities and personalities. The information vacuumed up by the N.S.A. was already available to faceless bureaucrats in phone and Internet companies — not government employees, but strangers just the same. Many people write as though we make some great sacrifice by disclosing private information to others, but it is in fact simply the way that we obtain services we want** — whether the market services of doctors, insurance companies, Internet service providers, employers, therapists and the rest, or the nonmarket services of the government like welfare and security.

Even so, I am exaggerating the nature of the intrusion. **The chance that human beings in government will actually read our e-mails or check our phone records is infinitesimal** (though I can understand that organizations like the A.C.L.U. that have a legitimate interest in communicating with potential government targets may be more vulnerable than the rest of us). **Mostly all we are doing is making our information available to a computer algorithm, which is unlikely to laugh at our infirmities or gossip about our relationships.**

The second objection is a lot more serious. We know that our government is capable of misusing information in this way, as occurred during the Nixon administration. Many people seem to believe that President Obama sent telepathic signals to I.R.S. workers instructing them to harass Tea Party organizations. But **I am unaware — and correct me if I am wrong — of a single instance during the last 12 years of war-on-terror-related surveillance in which the government used information obtained for security purposes to target a political opponent, dissenter or critic. That means that, for now, this objection is strictly theoretical, and the mere potential for abuse can't by itself be a good reason to shut down a program. If it were, we would have no government.**

*****Affirmative and Article Summaries*****



Affirmative Summary – Surveillance State Repeal Act

Inherency

The affirmative says that the NSA has overstepped its bounds and is currently spying on all Americans in an attempt to locate terrorist. The ProPublica, 13 piece of evidence details how this is happening. It says billions of calls, emails, and social media post are collected daily. This bulk collection of data is known as metadata.

Harms

The Valeri 13 piece of evidence says that surveillance is making it hard for humans to communicate and ultimately encroaching on our human rights. This creates a social norm of censorship which, intentionally or not, begins to erode society as we know it because we no longer speak out against possible government oppression.

The Sadowski 13 evidence says privacy must be viewed in a different light. Sadowski cites Georgetown Law Professor Julie E. Cohen who believes that privacy isn't just the protection of your personal data but privacy allows you to develop an identity free from coercion or better put government interference. Cohen says this allows the citizenry to develop a better society one free of conflict or judgement. Article four may also have another card that will act as an extension to this card.

Solvency

The Clabough 15 evidence says the SSRA solves these issues. The SSRA removes the various tools the NSA has to collect metadata and spy on Americans within the United States. It specifically says "The warrantless collection of millions of personal communications from innocent Americans is a direct violation of our constitutional right to privacy,"

Article Summaries – Affirmative

The first 4 articles are the same as the affirmative please refer to the Affirmative Summary for those articles.

Article 5: Does Surveillance Stop Terrorism

Zeynep Tufekci, a professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, says mass data does not prevent terrorism, even going so far as to say “mass surveillance and big data analytics are not the right tool for extremely rare events like acts of terrorism.” She says that mass surveillance slows us down in the fight for terrorism.

Article 6: Is Terrorism really a threat

John Mueller, professor of political science at Ohio States, here is making the argument that terrorism has a substantially low risk of occurring. Mueller uses evidence from counterterrorism officials. They believe that America has a 1 in 3.5 million chance suffering another terrorist attack.

Article 7: Would surveillance have stop 9/11?

Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst, says actually a reduced version of surveillance provide all the information needed to prevent 9/11 and that it was in a policy failure by the Bush Administration that allowed it to happen. The article does NOT make the argument that no surveillance is good but that the issue of solving terrorism is a sharing data issue not a data collection issue.

Article 8: Is nuclear terrorism possible?

This article looks at the possibility that terrorist can either build or acquire. First the article says that states don't sponsor terrorist and if they did sell the weapons to terrorist that it is easily tractable and could be found before any type of attack could happen. Second, terrorist lack sophistication to both steal and build nuclear weapons, this is proven because the 40 kilograms of uranium stolen from Mosel University means that had terrorist really wanted to build a weapon they would not have stolen such a low grade

Article Summaries – Negative

Article 1: Why surveillance isn't a problem.

Charles Lane, a Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial writer, states that surveillance isn't a huge threat to rights and that this is a part of most democracies. There has always been a tradeoff between liberty and security and that at its worst the revelations by Snowden do not mean the U.S. is a tyranny.

Article 2: Does the plan stop private surveillance?

This article is making the argument that even if the plan stops the NSA from engaging in surveillance private companies will continue as it is part of their business structure. Companies like Facebook and Google prove this. The importance is that there really is no privacy.

Article 3: Does the plan stop NSA surveillance?

Here Assange says the lack of political will and secrecy means we will never really know if the law can restrict surveillance.

Article 4: How current laws prevent terrorism

The article discusses that only a limited number have access to the data and they are barred from any data-mining. The article ends by stating that limitations to data mining could hamper efforts to fight terrorism.

Article 5: How the plan causes terrorism

John Yoo, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General, argues that we already have info on known terrorists; it is the unknown we must be concerned about. Yoo says that because of the risk of terrorism the U.S. must operate at a high level of speed and placing impediments on the U.S.'s ability to track terrorists could not come at a worst time.

Article 6: The impact to terrorism

The CBS article says the terrorist group ISIS is highly motivated and the U.S. does not know where or when they may try to launch their next 9/11 attack.

Article 7: Why a terrorist could use a nuclear weapon

Russ Wellen, an editor at the Institute for Policy Studies and nuclear disarmament expert, makes several points. First, ISIS has the financial assets to acquire nuclear materials. Second, intelligence officials believe that they could use connections within Russia to gain a nuclear weapon. Finally, Wellen indicates that if a device was detonated in Europe or America the consequences could be disastrous.

Article 8: Why security is more important than liberty

2015 Atlanta Urban Debate League

Starter Evidence Packet (SSRA Affirmative and Terrorism Disadvantage)

Jean Elshtain, Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago, makes the argument that in a world where security and peace are in jeopardy no other rights can flourish. The article also list a number of rights (goods as it calls it) that rely on security.

Article 9: Why NSA surveillance is not a bad thing

Eric Posner, Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, is making the argument that what the NSA does is not very intrusive and that the potential for abuse should not be a requirement to should down governmental actions. He says that if this became the standard then we would not have a government.

*****Affirmative Articles*****



Affirmative Article I: The Status Quo

According to ProPublica, an investigative journalism non-profit, in 2013: (In “FAQ: What You Need to Know About the NSA’s Surveillance Programs,” published 6-27-13. Available at <http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collection-faq>)

Write your own tag here:

We don’t know all of the different types of information the NSA collects, but several secret collection programs have been revealed:

A record of most calls made in the U.S., including the telephone number of the phones making and receiving the call, and how long the call lasted. This information is known as “**metadata**” and doesn’t include a recording of the actual call (but see below). This program was revealed through a **leaked** secret court order instructing Verizon to turn over all such information on a daily basis. Other phone companies, including AT&T and Sprint, also reportedly give their records to the NSA on a continual basis. All together, this is several billion calls per day.

Email, Facebook posts and instant messages for an unknown number of people, via PRISM, which involves the cooperation of at least nine different technology companies. Google, Facebook, Yahoo and others have denied that the NSA has “direct access” to their servers, saying they only release user information in response to a court order. Facebook has revealed that, in the last six months of 2012, they handed over the private data of between 18,000 and 19,000 users to law enforcement of all types -- including local police and federal agencies, such as the FBI, Federal Marshals and the NSA.

Massive amounts of raw Internet traffic The NSA intercepts huge amounts of raw data, and stores billions of communication records per day in its databases. Using the NSA’s XKEYSCORE software, analysts can see “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” including emails, social media posts, web sites you visit, addresses typed into Google Maps, files sent, and more. Currently the NSA is only authorized to intercept Internet communications with at least one end outside the U.S., though the domestic collection program used to be broader. But because there is no fully reliable automatic way to **separate domestic from international communications**, this program also captures some amount of U.S. citizens’ purely domestic Internet activity, such as emails, social media posts, instant messages, the sites you visit and online purchases you make...

It’s important to note that the NSA probably has information about you even if you aren’t on this target list. If you have previously communicated with someone who has been targeted, then the NSA already has the content of any emails, instant messages, phone calls, etc. you exchanged with the targeted person. Also, your data is likely in bulk records such as phone metadata and Internet traffic recordings. This is what makes these programs “**mass surveillance**,” as opposed to traditional wiretaps, which are authorized by individual, specific court orders.

Affirmative Article 2: How do we solve the problem

According to Raven Clabough, a reporter at The New American, in 2015 (In “House Members Target Patriot Act with ‘Surveillance State Repeal Act,’” published 3-31-15. Available at <http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/20560-house-members-target-patriot-act-with-surveillance-state-repeal-act>)

U.S. Representatives Mark Pocan (D-Wis., photo on left) and Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), who are seeking to repeal **the PATRIOT Act** in its entirety and combat any legal provisions that amount to American spying, unveiled their **Surveillance State Repeal Act** on Tuesday.

“This isn’t just tinkering around the edges,” Pocan said during a Capitol Hill briefing on the legislation. “This is a meaningful overhaul of the system, getting rid of essentially all parameters of the PATRIOT Act.”

“The PATRIOT Act contains many provisions that violate the **Fourth Amendment** and have led to a dramatic expansion of our domestic surveillance state,” added Massie (R-Ky.), who co-authored the legislation with Pocan. “Our Founding Fathers fought and died to stop the kind of **warrantless spying** and searches that the PATRIOT Act and the **FISA Amendments Act** authorize. It is long past time to repeal the PATRIOT Act and reassert the constitutional rights of all Americans.”

The House bill would completely repeal the PATRIOT Act, passed in the days following the 9/11 attacks, as well as the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, which permits the NSA to collect Internet communications — a program exposed by former NSA contractor-turned-**whistleblower Edward Snowden**.

Likewise, the bill would **reform the court that oversees the nation’s spying powers, enhance protections for whistleblowers**, and stop the government from forcing technology companies to create easy access into their devices.

“The **warrantless** collection of millions of personal communications from innocent Americans is a direct violation of our constitutional right to privacy,” declared Congressman Pocan, adding,

“Revelations about the NSA’s programs reveal the extraordinary extent to which the program has invaded Americans’ privacy. I reject the notion that we must sacrifice liberty for security. We can live in a secure nation which also upholds a strong commitment to **civil liberties**.”

Massie stated, “Really, what we need are new whistleblower protections so that the next Edward Snowden doesn’t have to go to Russia or Hong Kong or whatever the case may be just for disclosing this.”

Affirmative Article 3: Why Privacy Matters

According to Andy Valeri, an adjunct professor at the School of Advertising Art, in 2013: (Also M.A. Interdisciplinary Studies, founder of UnCommon Sense TVMedia. In “Communication, Human Rights, and The Threat of Weapons of Mass Surveillance: Why Communication Rights Are Essential To the Protection and Advancement of Human Rights in the 21st Century.” Paper presented at the conference on The Social Practice of Human Rights: Charting the Frontiers of Research and Advocacy University of Dayton, October 3-5, 2013. Available at http://ecommons.udayton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=human_rights)

The rapidly expanding and indiscriminate use of these weapons of mass surveillance is destroying the intrinsic capacity for human beings to communicate and to share information in ways [consistent] with our fundamental human rights to privacy, information, and communication. It threatens our ability to maintain our personal dignity and authenticity as human beings, by degrading our right and ability to define and control the meaning and purpose of the lives we live, and the relationships we engage with among each other...

Under the auspices of fighting a seemingly perpetual war against an ever-present threat of ‘terrorism,’ the Internet has become the active terrain of war, and is considered a battleground, part of the “operational domain” of the military (Alexander, 2011). And battlegrounds are the least hospitable of environments for the provision and the protection of human rights and the rule of law (Human Rights and Conflicts, n.d.). The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), with no legal mandate, and beyond the bounds of American constitutional and international human rights law, has made it its own explicit policy to collect and monitor every single form of electronic communication on the planet (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013). Or, as in the words of NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander, to “collect it all” (Nakashima & Warrick, 2013), mirroring the official motto of the **Stasi, the infamous secret police force of the former East Germany** - “To Know Everything...”

Perhaps even more disconcerting are the demonstrable effects that persistent surveillance has on the psychological well being of individuals and societies. Studies have detailed the many distorting impacts that it has on how we think and act (Parramore, 2013). Some have shown that the electronic monitoring of employees increases the levels of tension, anxiety, anger, depression, even boredom and fatigue among workers (Smith, Carayon, Sanders, Lim & LeGrande, 1992)... studies show that, regardless of the amount of official censorship present, the shifting of “**social norms**” in respect to privacy expectations has a marked impact on our willingness “to confide, to criticize, to make mistakes, to change our minds” (Kendzior, 2012)... Czech writer, dissident, and later president **Václav Havel**, argued that the credibility of the entire structure of society itself is eroded by its reliance upon rituals and norms “untested by public discussion and controversy” (Keane, 2000).

When it comes to the destructive effects wrought by mass surveillance, there is probably no more brutal example than that of **Ceausescu’s Rumania**, where truly every action observable would be reported to the secret police (Duque, 2011). In such a society, deliberate deception becomes the key to survival, a trait which quickly bleeds into all other human relations; personal, family, commercial, etc. The true cost of surveillance thus becomes the destruction of society itself (Duque, 2011).

Affirmative Article 4: Why Liberty Is More Important Than Security

According to Jathan Sadowski who studies applied ethics and the human and social dimensions of science and technology at Arizona State University. On February 26 2013. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/why-does-privacy-matter-one-scholars-answer/273521/>)

Our privacy is now at risk in unprecedented ways, but, sadly, the legal system is lagging behind the pace of innovation. Indeed, the last major privacy law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, was passed in 1986! While an update to the law -- spurred on by the General Petraeus scandal -- is in the works, it only aims to add some more protection to electronic communication like emails. This still does not shield our privacy from other, possibly nefarious, ways that our data can be collected and put to use. Some legislators would much rather not have legal restrictions that could, as Rep. Marsha Blackburn stated in an op-ed, "threaten the lifeblood of the Internet: data." Consider Rep. Blackburn's remarks during an April 2010 Congressional hearing: "[A]nd what happens when you follow the European privacy model and take information out of the information economy? ... Revenues fall, innovation stalls and you lose out to innovators who choose to work elsewhere."

Even though the practices of many companies such as Facebook are legal, there is something disconcerting about them. Privacy should have a deeper purpose than the one ascribed to it by those who treat it as a currency to be traded for innovation, which in many circumstances seems to actually mean corporate interests. To protect our privacy, we need a better understanding of its purpose and why it is valuable.

That's where Georgetown University law professor Julie E. Cohen comes in. In a forthcoming article for the Harvard Law Review, she lays out a strong argument that addresses the titular concern "What Privacy Is For." Her approach is fresh, and as technology critic Evgeny Morozov rightly tweeted, she wrote "the best paper on privacy theory you'll get to read this year." (He was referring to 2012.)

At bottom, Cohen's argument criticizes the dominant position held by theorists and legislators who treat privacy as just an instrument used to advance some other principle or value, such as liberty, inaccessibility, or control. Framed this way, privacy is relegated to one of many defenses we have from things like another person's prying eyes, or Facebook's recent attempts to ramp up its use of facial-recognition software and collect further data about us without our explicit consent. As long as the principle in question can be protected through some other method, or if privacy gets in the way of a different desirable goal like innovation, it is no longer useful and can be disregarded.

Cohen doesn't think we should treat privacy as a dispensable instrument. To the contrary, she argues privacy is irreducible to a "fixed condition or attribute (such as seclusion or control) whose boundaries can be crisply delineated by the application of deductive logic. Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the process of ... self-development."

What Cohen means is that since life and contexts are always changing, privacy cannot be reductively conceived as one specific type of thing. It is better understood as an important buffer that gives us space to develop an identity that is somewhat separate from the surveillance, judgment, and values of our society and culture. Privacy is crucial for helping us manage all of these pressures -- pressures that shape the type of

person we are -- and for "creating spaces for play and the work of self-[development]." Cohen argues that this self-development allows us to discover what type of society we want and what we should do to get there, both factors that are key to living a fulfilled life.

Woodrow Hartzog and Evan Selinger make similar arguments in a recent article on the value of "obscurity." When structural constraints prevent unwanted parties from getting to your data, obscurity protections are in play. These protections go beyond preventing companies from exploiting our information for their financial gain. They safeguard democratic societies by furthering "autonomy, self-fulfillment, socialization, and relative freedom from the abuse of power."

In light of these considerations, what's really at stake in a feature like Facebook's rumored location-tracking app? You might think it is a good idea to willfully hand over your data in exchange for personalized coupons or promotions, or to broadcast your location to friends. But consumption -- perusing a store and buying stuff -- and quiet, alone time are both important parts of how we define ourselves. If how we do that becomes subject to ever-present monitoring it can, if even unconsciously, change our behaviors and self-perception.

In this sense, we will be developing an identity that is absent of privacy and subject to surveillance; we must decide if we really want to live in a society that treats every action as a data point to be analyzed and traded like currency. The more we allow for constant tracking, the more difficult it becomes to change the way that technologies are used to encroach on our lives.

Privacy is not just something we enjoy. It is something that is necessary for us to: develop who we are; form an identity that is not dictated by the social conditions that directly or indirectly influence our thinking, decisions, and behaviors; and decide what type of society we want to live in. Whether we like it or not constant data collection about everything we do -- like the kind conducted by Facebook and an increasing number of other companies -- shapes and produces our actions. We are different people when under surveillance than we are when enjoying some privacy. And Cohen's argument illuminates how the breathing room provided by privacy is essential to being a complete, fulfilled person.

Affirmative Article 5: Does Surveillance Stop Terrorism?

According to Zeynep Tufekci, a professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, in 2015: (In “Terror and the limits of mass surveillance,” published 2-3-15. Available at <http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2015/02/03/zeynep-tufekci-terror-and-the-limits-of-mass-surveillance/>)

Europe’s top human rights body, the Council of Europe, put out a report last week blasting governmental mass surveillance, joining a long list of organisations and individuals who have voiced strong moral and political objections to National Security Agency-type blanket surveillance. This latest report, like most such criticisms, misses a key point: despite the common notion that we are trading safety for liberty by letting governments scoop up so much of our data, the truth is that mass surveillance and big data analytics are not the right tool for extremely rare events like acts of terrorism in western societies...

Analytics on massive datasets can be powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or events that occur regularly and frequently, but are singularly unsuited to finding unpredictable, erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In fact, the bigger the haystack — the more massive the scale and the wider the scope of the surveillance — the less suited these methods are to finding such exceptional events, and the more they may serve to direct resources and attention away from appropriate tools and methods...

Seeking larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies every time that it detects a post containing violence, would deluge the agencies with multiple false leads that would lead to a data quagmire, rather than clues to impending crimes.

For big data analytics to work, there needs to be a reliable connection between the signal (posting of violent content) and the event (killing someone). Otherwise, the signal is worse than useless. Millions of Facebook’s billion-plus users post violent content every day, ranging from routinised movie violence to atrocious violent rhetoric. Turning over the data from all such occurrences would merely flood the agencies with “false positives” — erroneous indications for events that actually will not happen. Such data overload is not without cost, as it takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to confirm that they are, indeed, not needles — especially when we don’t even know what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads with no resolution, taking away resources from any real investigation...

When confronted with their failures in predicting those rare acts of domestic terrorism, here’s what GCHQ, and indeed the NSA, should have said instead of asking for increased surveillance capabilities: stop asking us to collect more and more data to perform an impossible task. This glut of data is making our job harder, not easier, and the expectation that there will never be such incidents, ever, is not realistic.

Affirmative Article 6: Is Terrorism Really A Threat?

According to John Mueller, professor of political science at Ohio States, in 2014: (Also writes extensively on. In "Has the threat from terrorism been exaggerated?" 1-8-14. Available at http://www.thecommentator.com/article/4579/has_the_threat_from_terrorism_been_exaggerated)

Two years after the raid on Osama bin Laden's hideaway, terrorism alarmists remain in peak form explaining that although al-Qaeda has been weakened it still manages to present a grave threat...

Yet its chief efforts at international terrorism have failed abysmally: an underwear bomb and laser printer bombs on cargo planes. With that track record, the group may pose a problem or concern, but it scarcely presents a "major threat" outside of war zones.

More generally, "al-Qaeda is its own worst enemy," as Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official, notes. "Where they have succeeded initially, they very quickly discredit themselves."

Any terrorist threat within the developed world seems even less impressive. The Boston terrorists of 2013 were the first in the United States since 9/11 in which Islamist terrorists actually were able to assemble and detonate bombs -- albeit very primitive ones. But except for that, they do not seem to have been more competent than most of their predecessors. Amazingly, they apparently thought they could somehow get away with their deed even though they chose to set their bombs off at the most-photographed spot on the planet at the time...

Before Boston, some 16 people had been killed by Islamist terrorists in the United States in the years since 2001, and all of these were murdered by people who were essentially acting alone. By contrast, in the 1970s, organized terrorists inflicted hundreds of attacks, mostly bombings, in the United States, killing 72...

At current rates, an American's chance of becoming a victim of terrorism in the U.S., even with 9/11 in the calculation, is about 1 in 3.5 million per year. In comparison, that same American stands a 1 in 22,000 yearly chance of becoming a homicide victim, a 1 in 8,000 chance of perishing in an auto accident, and a 1 in 500 chance of dying from cancer...

one terrorism specialist, Peter Bergen, has observed in heroic full attribution mode that, "The last terror attack (in the West) was seven years ago in London," that there "haven't been any major attacks in the U.S.," and that "they are recruiting no-hopers and dead-enders."

Terrorists do, of course, exist -- as they have throughout history. They may even get lucky again sometime. Thus, concern and watchfulness about terrorism is justified. But counterterrorism expenditures that are wildly disproportionate to the limited hazard terrorism presents are neither wise nor responsible.

Affirmative Article 7: Would Surveillance Have Stopped 9/11?

According to Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst and author of three bestselling books on Al Qaeda, in 2013: (In "Would NSA surveillance have stopped 9/11 plot?" published 12-30-13. Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/30/opinion/bergen-nsa-surveillance-september-11/>)

The Obama administration has framed its defense of the controversial bulk collection of all American phone records as necessary to prevent a future 9/11... But is it really the case that the U.S. intelligence community didn't have the dots in the lead up to 9/11? Hardly. In fact, the intelligence community provided repeated strategic warning in the summer of 9/11 that al Qaeda was planning a large-scale attacks on American interests.

Here is a representative sampling of the CIA threat reporting that was distributed to Bush administration officials during the spring and summer of 2001:

- CIA, "Bin Ladin Planning Multiple Operations," April 20
- CIA, "Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent," June 23
- CIA, "Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delays," July 2...

The failure to respond adequately to these warnings was a policy failure by the Bush administration, not an intelligence failure by the U.S. intelligence community...

The CIA itself also had its own spectacular failure in the run up to 9/11, which wasn't a failure to collect intelligence, but a failure of information sharing. The CIA had quite a bit of information about two of the hijackers and their presence in the United States before 9/11, which the agency didn't share with other government agencies until it was too late to do anything about it.

The government missed multiple opportunities to catch al Qaeda hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar when he was living in San Diego for a year and a half in the run up to 9/11, not because it lacked access to all Americans phone records but because it didn't share the information it already possessed about the soon-to-be hijacker within other branches of the government...

Since we can't run history backward, all we can say with certainty is that it is an indisputable fact that the proper sharing of intelligence by the CIA with other agencies about al-Mihdhar may well have derailed the 9/11 plot. And it is merely an untestable hypothesis that if the NSA bulk phone collection program had been in place at the time that it might have helped to find the soon-to-be-hijackers in San Diego.

Indeed, the overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they don't gather enough information from the bulk surveillance of American phone data but that they don't sufficiently understand or widely share the information they already possess that is derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques.

Affirmative Article 8: Is Nuclear Terrorism Possible?

According to Matthew Cottee and Dina Esfandiary, both terrorism researchers, in 2014 (Matthew is a research analyst with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dina is a MacArthur Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London. In "The very small Islamic State WMD threat," published 10-15-14. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-state-wmd-threat7729>)

Late last month British Home Secretary Theresa May, who is responsible for immigration and policing under Prime Minister David Cameron, alarmed many citizens when she warned that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) could "acquire chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons to attack us..."

With ISIS running amok over such a large swathe of territory, it's no surprise that these kinds of fears are growing. But it is important to be realistic about the threat. It remains unlikely that the group will be able to acquire and effectively use **chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons**.

For a start, concerns that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear device from a country that possesses them are exaggerated and have been comprehensively discredited. Very few countries **sponsor terrorism** or wish to be seen as doing so, and **nuclear forensics** would make it relatively straightforward to find the source of any given device. The consequences for any state conducting such business would be severe.

Some of the hysteria surrounding ISIS and WMD is based on the theft in July of around 40 kilograms of uranium compounds from Mosul University. But if this was a targeted attempt to acquire nuclear material—rather than part of a broader raid on the university—it suggests that the thieves' knowledge of nuclear bomb-making lacks sophistication. The stolen material cannot be turned into a viable nuclear device: The **uranium was low-grade** and would have to be further enriched and then weaponized, requiring obscure raw materials and technologies, a delivery means, and facilities that would take years and a significant sum of money to develop. It took the United States, with its vast resources and advanced knowhow, six years to develop a nuclear device. It took China roughly 10 years and Pakistan more than two decades. Needless to say, even for an established country, developing a nuclear weapon is not simple...

In short, ISIS does seem interested in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but ambitions do not necessarily equate with reality. The complexities of such weapons, combined with the difficulties involved in obtaining and handling the necessary material, make the likelihood of its use remote. Let's not exaggerate the threat.

*****Negative Articles*****



Negative Article 1: Why Surveillance Isn't A Problem

According to Charles Lane, a Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial writer, in 2013: (Op-ed in the Washington Post, 7-15-13. "NSA Surveillance is Within Democracy's Bounds." Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-lane-nsa-surveillance-is-within-democracys-bounds/2013/07/15/d509b1ae-ed8a-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html)

The methods of surveillance and intelligence-gathering — bribery, blackmail, wiretapping, infiltration and the rest — are not normal tools of democratic governance. To the contrary: There is a basic tension, or trade-off, between democracy and secrecy, and it's absurd to deny it.

Yet it is equally absurd to suggest, as Jakob Augstein did in *Der Spiegel*, that “no matter in what system or to what purpose: A monitored human being is not a free human being.”

The political goals and institutional context of a given state's intelligence-gathering make all the difference. In East Germany, the purpose of surveillance was to protect an unelected party that exercised a monopoly of political and economic power on behalf of a foreign military occupier, the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party's ideology politicized every aspect of life, rendering the pettiest deviations, in word or deed, threatening — and thus subject to secret official scrutiny.

Unchecked by any law, Stasi spying evolved into an end in itself. East Germany really was a “surveillance state.”

Despite much rhetoric from Snowden's camp, the United States does not fit that admittedly vague description: No party holds or plausibly aspires to a monopoly on power in this country, with its centuries-old constitutional separation of powers, two-party system, free press, private sector and robust civil society. Many fault the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as a pawn of the NSA, forgetting that it was one of many reforms Americans instituted in the 1970s to correct previous intelligence abuses — and how rare it is for any nation to subject intelligence-gathering to even minimal judicial oversight. Nor does the U.S. government define the normal exercise of freedom as inherently threatening; the terrorists and other threats about which it gathers secret intelligence are not imaginary...

In short, even the most worrisome issues Snowden has raised amount to manageable trade-offs between liberty and security, for both the United States and its allies.

He may deserve credit for energizing the debate, but not for enabling the Stasi-analogizers, or for referring to the United States with phrases like “turnkey tyranny” and “architecture of oppression.” The excessiveness of that language should be more apparent to him with each day he spends in Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Negative Article 2: Does The Plan Stop Private Surveillance?

According to Bruce Schneier, a specialist in Internet technology at Harvard Law School, in 2013: (Cryptographer and computer security specialist, fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. In "Stalker Economy Is Here To Stay," November 2013. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/20/opinion/schneier-stalker-economy/index.html>)

Google recently announced that it would start including individual users' names and photos in some ads. This means that if you rate some product positively, your friends may see ads for that product with your name and photo attached—without your knowledge or consent. Meanwhile, Facebook is eliminating a feature that allowed people to retain some portions of their anonymity on its website...

It shouldn't come as a surprise that big technology companies are tracking us on the Internet even more aggressively than before. If these features don't sound particularly beneficial to you, it's because you're not the customer of any of these companies. You're the product, and you're being improved for their actual customers: their advertisers. This is nothing new. For years, these sites and others have systematically improved their "product" by reducing user privacy...

The result is a world where our most intimate personal details are collected and stored. I used to say that Google has a more intimate picture of what I'm thinking of than my wife does. But that's not far enough: Google has a more intimate picture than I do. The company knows exactly what I am thinking about, how much I am thinking about it, and when I stop thinking about it: all from my Google searches. And it remembers all of that forever.

As the **Edward Snowden revelations** continue to expose the full extent of the National Security Agency's eavesdropping on the Internet, it has become increasingly obvious how much of that has been enabled by the corporate world's existing eavesdropping on the Internet. The **public/private surveillance partnership** is fraying, but it's largely alive and well. The NSA didn't build its eavesdropping system from scratch; it got itself a copy of what the corporate world was already collecting...

Internet companies deliberately make privacy not salient. When you log onto Facebook, you don't think about how much personal information you're revealing to the company; you're chatting with your friends. When you wake up in the morning, you don't think about how you're going to allow a bunch of companies to track you throughout the day; you just put your cell phone in your pocket...

Surveillance is the business model of the Internet -- Al Gore recently called it a "stalker economy." All major websites run on advertising, and the more personal and targeted that advertising is, the more revenue the site gets for it. As long as we users remain the product, there is minimal incentive for these companies to provide any real privacy.

Negative Article 3: Does The Plan Stop NSA Surveillance?

According to Julian Assange, editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, in 2012: (Conversation in the book “Cyberpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet,” chapter titled “The Militarization of Cyberspace”)

But are there two approaches to dealing with mass state surveillance: the laws of physics; and the laws of man? One is to use the laws of physics by actually building devices that prevent interception. The other is to enact democratic controls through the law to make sure people must have warrants and so on and to try to gain some regulatory accountability. But strategic interception cannot be a part of that, cannot be meaningfully constrained by regulation. Strategic interception is about intercepting everyone regardless of whether they are innocent or guilty. We must remember that it is the core of the Establishment carrying such surveillance. There will always be a lack of political will to expose state spying. And the technology is inherently so complex, and its use in practice so secret that there cannot be meaningful democratic oversight...

Once you have erected this surveillance, given that it is complex, given that it is designed to operate in secret, isn't it true that it cannot be regulated with policy? I think that except for very small nations like Iceland, unless there are revolutionary conditions it is simply not possible to control mass interception with legislation and policy. It is just not going to happen. It is too cheap and too easy to get around political accountability and to actually perform interception. The Swedes got through an interception bill in 2008, known as the FRA-lagen which meant the Swedish signals intelligence agency the FRA could legally intercept all communication travelling through the country in bulk, and ship it off to the United States, with some caveats. 48 Now how can you enforce those caveats once you've set up the interception system and the organization doing it is a secret spy agency? It's impossible.

And in fact cases have come out showing that the FRA had on a variety of occasions broken the law previously. Many countries simply do it off-law with no legislative cover at all. So we're sort of lucky if, like in the Swedish example, they decided that for their own protection from prosecution they want to go legal by changing the law. And that's the case for most countries— there is bulk interception occurring, and when there is a legislative proposal it is to protect the ass of those who are doing it.

This technology is very complex; for example in the debate in Australia and the UK about proposed legislation to intercept all metadata, most people do not understand the value of metadata or even the word itself. Intercepting all metadata means you have to build a system that physically intercepts all data and then throws everything but the metadata away. But such a system cannot be trusted. There's no way to determine whether it is in fact intercepting and storing all data without having highly skilled engineers with authorization to go in and check out precisely what is going on, and there's no political will to grant access. The problem is getting worse because complexity and secrecy are a toxic mix. Hidden by complexity. Hidden by secrecy. Unaccountability is built-in. It is a feature. It is dangerous by design.

Negative Article 4: How Current Laws Prevent Terrorism

According to Fred Fleitz, 25-year veteran at the CIA and State Department, in 2015: (Currently senior vice president for policy and programs for the Center for Security Policy. In “NSA Data Collection: Necessary, or Unconstitutional?” 5-11-15. Available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418207/nsa-data-collection-necessary-or-unconstitutional-fred-fleitz>)

Although the Obama administration refuses to say that the attempted massacre by two heavily armed assailants at a “draw Mohammed” contest in Garland, Texas, was an act of terrorism directed by ISIS, there is little doubt this was the case. One of the heavily armed attackers had been in touch through Twitter with jihadists in Australia and Somalia who were associated with ISIS and who had called for attacks on the Garland event. ISIS also seemed to know about the attack in advance and immediately claimed responsibility for it. Pamela Geller, the organizer of the “draw Mohammed” contest, wrote this week that whether ISIS leaders actually directed the attack or only had foreknowledge of it is a distinction without a difference, since ISIS has called for attacks on the United States and published manuals explaining how homegrown Islamist terrorists can construct bombs and kill infidels...

This is why Senator Mitch McConnell recently introduced a “clean” — that is, with no changes at all — reauthorization of the Patriot Act, which extends three of its provisions on electronic-surveillance programs used to protect our country against terrorist attacks. The most controversial is the NSA metadata program enacted in Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Opponents of the 215 program claim it is an unconstitutional violation of privacy rights and say that it has played no role in protecting the United States from terrorist attacks. Both of these claims are untrue. Under the metadata program, the NSA collects large numbers of phone records — not the contents of phone calls — and uses them to make connections between terror suspects. The program is subject to strong oversight by the executive branch, Congress, and the courts and is used only for national-security investigations. Only 22 people at the NSA are allowed access to these metadata, and they are barred from any data-mining, even in connection with an investigation. While its detractors refuse to admit it, the 215 program has been a successful tool in stopping terrorist attacks. It has been strongly defended by many intelligence officials and members of Congress, including Senator Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.), vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who said during a January 14, 2014, Judiciary Committee hearing that this program had helped stop terrorist plots to bomb the New York City subways, the New York stock exchange, and a Danish newspaper...

Already the shock of the Snowden leaks is fading, and the grandstanding against the NSA by Senator Paul, other libertarians, and the Left is becoming tiresome. This could mean the metadata program might be revised in a few years under a new Republican president. Unfortunately, before that time comes, there is a real danger of an ISIS terrorist attack in the United States if Congress seriously weakens the metadata program. Congress needs to think long and hard about such an outcome as it moves ahead with legislation on this issue this month.

Negative Article 5: How The Plan Causes Terrorism

According to John Yoo, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General, in 2006 (Current law professor at UC Berkeley. In "The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution," 1-1-06. <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=facpubs>)

An **intelligence search** conducted today, as Judge Richard Posner has described it, "is a search for a needle in a haystack." Rather than focus on foreign agents who are already known, counter-terrorism agencies must search for clues among millions of potentially innocent connections, communications, and links. "The intelligence services," Posner writes, "must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the clues that may enable the next attack to be prevented."⁶ Our best information about al Qaeda will be scattered and tough to gather, and our agents must be able to follow many leads quickly and move fast on hunches and educated guesses.

Members of the al Qaeda network can be detected, with good intelligence work or luck, by examining phone and e-mail communications, as well as evidence of joint travel, shared assets, common histories or families, meetings, and so on.⁶⁶ As the time for an attack nears, "chatter" on this network will increase as al Qaeda operatives communicate to coordinate plans, move and position assets, and conduct target reconnaissance.⁶⁷ When our intelligence agents successfully locate or capture an al Qaeda member, they must be able to move quickly to connect new information to other operatives before news of the capture causes these operatives to disappear. It is more important to chase them down quickly inside the United States than outside. Incredibly, critics want to place bureaucratic impediments precisely at this juncture, where the danger to America is greatest.

Take the example of the 9/11 hijackers. Since the attack, links suggested by commercially available data have shown ties between every single one of the al Qaeda plotters and Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawar al Hazmi, the two hijackers known to the CIA in the summer of 2001 to have been in the country.⁶⁹ Mihdhar and Hazmi had rented apartments in their own name and were listed in the San Diego phone book.⁷⁰ Both Mohammad Atta, the leader of the 9/11 al Qaeda cell, and Marwan al-Shehi, who piloted one of planes into the World Trade Center, had lived with them.⁷¹ Hijacker Majed Moqed used the same frequent flier number as Hazmi. Five hijackers used the same phone number as Atta when booking their flights.⁷² The remaining hijackers shared addresses or phone numbers with Ahmed Alghamdi, a hijacker who was in the United States in violation of his visa at the time.⁷³

Our intelligence agents, in fact, had strong leads that could conceivably have led them to all the hijackers before 9/11 had they located some of the operatives through intercepted communications...

Subsequent interrogations and investigations have uncovered information on dozens or hundreds of e-mail addresses, telephones, bank and credit account numbers, and residential and office addresses used by their network." To exploit this wealth of information, our intelligence services must follow leads as fast as possible, before the network of al Qaeda operatives can migrate to a new leader. An e-mail lead can disappear as fast as it takes someone to open a new e-mail account. Our agents need to move even faster.

Negative Article 6: The Impact To Terrorism

According to Rebecca Kaplan, a political reporter at CBS, in 2014 (In "Will ISIS plan a 9/11-style terror plot against the U.S.?" 6-16-14. Available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-isis-plan-a-911-style-terror-plot-against-the-u-s/>)

As the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - which has already captured the cities of Tikrit and Mosul and is threatening to take the capital city as well - grows in strength and numbers, will it pose an immediate threat to the United States homeland as well?

Experts say the group's increasing power and reach is concerning, though it's not entirely clear when they might be able to threaten the U.S. "You've got motivation mixed with opportunity, ideology and foreign fighters and all of that looks like a very extreme version of Afghanistan in the '90s, plus what was happening in Iraq after the Iraq war," said CBS News National Security Analyst Juan Zarate. "This is a cauldron of future terrorist threats to the west."

The bigger danger, Zarate said, is that the U.S. does not yet know exactly what the group will look like once it evolves. While ISIS might not launch an attack on U.S. soil tomorrow, he said, "I think the grave threat here is that you have the seeds of a new terrorist movement emerging very aggressively."

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said on CBS' "Face the Nation" Sunday that U.S. officials have warned the next major attack on U.S. soil could emanate from the region. "The seeds of 9/11s are being planted all over Iraq and Syria," Graham said. "They want an Islamic caliphate that runs through Syria and Iraq...and they plan to drive us out of the Mideast by attacking us here at home."

Zarate warned about the influence of senior al Qaeda figures who traveled to Syria and could be working to turn ISIS' attention toward the west.

"You do have very senior al Qaeda figures who have migrated to the Syrian conflict to provide strategic guidance and direction and to me that's incredibly dangerous because you have operatives and strategists who have had squarely in mind to turn the attention of these groups toward the west," he said.

One of Rogers' principal concerns is the threat posed by American and European fighters who traveled to what he called "jihadist Disneyland" in eastern Syria and have been radicalized. Just last month, a U.S. citizen linked to al Qaeda terrorists carried out a suicide bombing in Syria.

ISIS "is an al Qaeda-inspired group that certainly has al Qaeda ties, that now has the capability to tap people with Western passports to send them back to Europe and the United States for terrorist activity. That's a problem for us," Rogers said.

Negative Article 7: Why Terrorists Could Use Nuclear Weapons

According to Russ Wellen, an editor at the Institute for Policy Studies and nuclear disarmament expert, in 2014: (In “Is the Islamic State Capable of Nuclear Terrorism?” 10-21-14. Available at <http://fpif.org/islamic-state-capable-nuclear-terrorism/>)

After 9/11, many feared that Al Qaeda would get its hands on nuclear weapons... In fact, Al Qaeda had made attempts to obtain nuclear materials...

Now such fears are beginning to be transferred to the Islamic State. [According to] Ploughshares Fund President Joseph Cirincione:

“[The Islamic State, or ISIS’s] seizure of banks and oil fields gave it more than \$2 billion in assets. If ISIS could make the right connection to corrupt officials in Russia or Pakistan, the group might be able to buy enough highly enriched uranium (about 50 pounds) and the technical help to build a crude nuclear device. Militants recruited from Europe or America could help smuggle it into their home nations”

Or ISIS could try to build a “dirty bomb,” conventional explosives like dynamite laced with highly radioactive materials. The blast would not kill many directly, but it would force the evacuation of tens of square blocks contaminated with radioactive particles.

The terror and economic consequences of a bomb detonated in the financial districts of London or New York would be enormous...

And from whom does the Islamic State propose to obtain nuclear know-how, material, or actual weapons?

In the document, which has been examined by western security officials — who believe it to be authentic — Meshedani wrote that ISIS aims to get hold of nuclear weapons with the help of Russia, to whom it would offer access to gas fields it controls in Iraq’s Anbar province...

It may not be much of a problem now, but it could be some day. On October 1 the New York Daily News reported on a statement by British Home Secretary Theresa May...: “If (ISIS) succeeds in firmly consolidating their grip on the land they occupy in Syria and Iraq, we will see the world’s first truly terrorist state established within a few hours flying time of our country,” ... Britain and the West cannot cede ISIS “the space to plot attacks against us, train their men and women, and devise new methods to kill indiscriminately,” she said.

“We will see the risk, often prophesied, but thank God not yet fulfilled, that with the capability of a state behind them, the terrorists will acquire chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons to attack us.”

Negative Article 8: Why Security Is More Important Than Liberty

According to Jean Elshtain, Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago, in 2003 (In his book "Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World," p. 46-48)

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, I said to a friend, "Now we are reminded of what governments are for." The primary responsibility of government is to provide basic security—ordinary civic peace...

Portions of the U.S. Constitution refer specifically to security and public safety. "To ensure domestic tranquillity" was central to what the new order being created after the American Revolution was all about. None of the goods that human beings cherish, including the free exercise of religion, can flourish without a measure of civic peace and security.

What good or goods do I have in mind? Mothers and fathers raising their children; men and women going to work; citizens of a great city making their way on streets and subways; ordinary people flying to California to visit the grandchildren or to transact business with colleagues— all of these actions are simple but profound goods made possible by civic peace. They include the faithful attending their churches, synagogues, and mosques without fear, and citizens—men and women, young and old, black, brown, and white—lining up to vote on Election Day. This civic peace is not the kingdom promised by scripture that awaits the end time...

Our condition of fallibility and imperfection precludes a world in which discontents never erupt. That said, the civic peace that violence disrupts does offer intimations of the peaceable kingdom. If we live from day to day in fear of deadly attack, the goods we cherish become elusive. Human beings are fragile creatures. We cannot reveal the fullness of our being, including our deep sociality, if airplanes are flying into buildings or snipers are shooting at us randomly or deadly spores are being sent through the mail. As we have learned so shockingly, we can neither take this civic peace for granted nor shake off our responsibility to respect and promote the norms and rules that sustain civic peace.

Negative Article 9: Why the NSA surveillance is not a bad thing

According to Eric Posner, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, in 2013 (In an article in the New York Times)

Jameel, I don't see the need for systemic reform, nor do I see an offense to the Constitution. Indeed, I don't even understand the nature of the objection to the National Security Agency programs. Exactly what harm did they cause? Two possibilities emerge from the current public discussion.

1. A general sense of creepiness that government officials know when we make phone calls, and for how long, or may even be reading our e-mail messages. Government should not look over our shoulders as we conduct our lives.
2. A fear that the government uses this information to undermine democracy — to blackmail, harass or embarrass critics, for example.

The first objection strikes me as weak. We already give the government an enormous amount of information about our lives, and seem to have gotten used to the idea that an Internal Revenue Service knows our finances, or that an employee of a government hospital knows our medical history, or that social workers (if we are on welfare) know our relationships with family members, or that public school teachers know about our children's abilities and personalities. The information vacuumed up by the N.S.A. was already available to faceless bureaucrats in phone and Internet companies — not government employees, but strangers just the same. Many people write as though we make some great sacrifice by disclosing private information to others, but it is in fact simply the way that we obtain services we want — whether the market services of doctors, insurance companies, Internet service providers, employers, therapists and the rest, or the nonmarket services of the government like welfare and security.

Even so, I am exaggerating the nature of the intrusion. The chance that human beings in government will actually read our e-mails or check our phone records is infinitesimal (though I can understand that organizations like the A.C.L.U. that have a legitimate interest in communicating with potential government targets may be more vulnerable than the rest of us). Mostly all we are doing is making our information available to a computer algorithm, which is unlikely to laugh at our infirmities or gossip about our relationships.

The second objection is a lot more serious. We know that our government is capable of misusing information in this way, as occurred during the Nixon administration. Many people seem to believe that President Obama sent telepathic signals to I.R.S. workers instructing them to harass Tea Party organizations. But I am unaware — and correct me if I am wrong — of a single instance during the last 12 years of war-on-terror-related surveillance in which the government used information obtained for security purposes to target a political opponent, dissenter or critic. That means that, for now, this objection is strictly theoretical, and the mere potential for abuse can't by itself be a good reason to shut down a program. If it were, we would have no government.

How To Use The Templates

When writing your own speeches, the templates are one way to organize the IAC or INC in a way that's likely to be understandable and persuasive to your judge.

The IAC, for example, contains a few basic parts:

- 1. The attention-getter** – some statistic, fact, story, or other introduction that gets the judges' attention and starts to persuade them that what you're talking about is important.
- 2. The problem** – a general outline of a problem that needs to be solved.
- 3. The need to act** – one or two reasons why it's very important to address the problem.
- 4. The plan** – the plan of action you're proposing, in this case offshore wind.
- 5. Solvency** – the reason why the plan of action will successfully deal with the problem.

For each part, the text in italics represent directions for types of arguments you might want to include; you shouldn't read them out loud, but you can use them to structure your argument and make sure you're including evidence from the articles that support what you're saying. For example, if your affirmative was about pizza at AUDL tournaments, you might fill out part of your IAC template to look like:

We begin with our First Contention – What is going on now? What is the problem?

(Short explanation) **Right now, there's not nearly enough pizza for all of the students at the tournament. According to** *(author and qualifications)* **Derrick Rose, a high school debater** *(source and date)* **at an AUDL tournament in 2014,** *(direct quote from article)* **“I don't even think there's enough pizza for each of us to have one slice. This is probably the worst pizza shortage I've ever seen at a tournament.” This shows that** *(briefly explain in your own words why this point is important)* **the food shortage at this tournament has reached desperate proportions.**

For more information on using the template and the articles, check out the surveillance packet.

1st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template

Attention Getter (a surprising statistic, interesting quotation, or useful story):

We begin with our First Contention – What is going on now? What is the problem?

(Short explanation)

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____

This shows that *(explain in your own words why this point is important)* _____

1st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template


Our second contention is the need to act. We have two reasons why we must act to solve this problem:

First,

(Short explanation) _____

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____

This shows that *(explain in your own words why this point is important)* _____



1st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template

Second,

(Short explanation) _____

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____

This shows that *(explain in your own words why this point is important)* _____



1st Affirmative Constructive (IAC) Template

As a result, we propose the following plan *(insert from one of the affs)* **NOTE YOU CANNOT CHANGE THE ORIGINAL PLAN TEXT IN THE PACKET THIS WILL HELP ENSURE CLASH AND PREDICTABLE DEBATES):**

Our final contention is Solvency – the reason why the plan will be successful

(short explanation) _____

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____

This shows that *(explain in your own words why this point is important)* _____

1st Negative Constructive (INC) Template: Disadvantages

A. What's happening now - right now, things are okay because

(short explanation) _____

According to (author and qualifications) _____ in (source and date) _____, (direct quote from article) _____

This shows that (explain in your own words why this point is important) _____

B. However, the affirmative's plan will change this situation because

(short explanation) _____

According to (author and qualifications) _____ in (source and date) _____, (direct quote from article) _____

This shows that (explain in your own words why this point is important) _____

1st Negative Constructive (INC) Template: Disadvantages

C. These changes would be disastrous and we must avoid them because

(short explanation) _____

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____



1st Negative Constructive (INC) Template: On-Case Arguments

The problems the affirmative talks about are overstated because:

1. (short explanation) _____

According to (author and qualifications) _____ in (source and date) _____, (direct quote from article) _____

This shows that (explain in your own words why this point is important) _____

2. (short explanation) _____

According to (author and qualifications) _____ in (source and date) _____, (direct quote from article) _____

This shows that (explain in your own words why this point is important) _____

1st Negative Constructive (INC) Template: On-Case Arguments

But even if those problems did exist, the affirmative's plan can't solve them because

1. *(short explanation)* _____

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____

This shows that *(explain in your own words why this point is important)* _____

2. *(short explanation)* _____

According to *(author and qualifications)* _____ in *(source and date)* _____, *(direct quote from article)* _____

This shows that *(explain in your own words why this point is important)* _____

