

Cuba Negative

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Explanation

This file contains some of the evidence you need to argue against the Cuba Embargo affirmative. You should consult the Explanation and Glossary sections of your affirmative file for more background information on the embargo and explanations of the affirmative's advantages.

In your 1NC, you should make sure you read a disadvantage plus some of the arguments in this file.

The affirmative will either discuss the Human Rights advantage or the Soft Power advantage. Since you can't control what they will read, you should be prepared to answer both sets of arguments.

Which disadvantage you read is up to you, but there is a recommendation for each of the advantages. If you have only prepared one disadvantage or feel strongly about one over the other, feel free to choose for yourself.

<p>Human Rights: If they read the Human Rights advantage, you can advance arguments about why lifting the embargo makes the problems worse for people in Cuba. You can also make arguments about Cuba's recent trade of weapons with North Korea. There are also a variety of solvency arguments you can make against this advantage. The democracy disadvantage is well-suited to answering this advantage.</p>	<p>Soft Power: If they read the Soft Power advantage, you can make arguments for why the plan does not translate into better relations with the world, and arguments about whether it would matter if it did. You have several ways of answering the US leadership arguments, and also some good solvency takeouts. The China disadvantage is well-suited to answering this advantage.</p>
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Harms – Human Rights – 1NC

1. Lifting the embargo would only make problems worse – it would give the government lines of credit to fund continued abuse.

Corzo, 2009 (Humberto, degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Havana, has 45 years of experience as an engineer working in the United States, “Lift the Cuba Embargo?”, April 2009, http://www.cubonet.org/CNews/y09/abril09/09_O_3.html)

The infusion of loans by the United States would only replace the Soviet subsidy that Castro no longer receives, thereby delaying the transition of the Cuban people towards democracy and guaranteeing additional decades of oppression and misery. Castro’s tyranny looks forward to the day when the military apparatus and the massive repressive security service will be maintained at the expense of the United States government.

The effect of the embargo on Cuba has partially fulfilled its objectives. It prevented Castro from obtaining loans and lines of credit that would allow him to finance his permanence in power and avoiding the growth of the indebtedness of Cuba without benefit for the population. Presently the Cuban regime’s debt has risen to \$22 billion with the countries of the old socialist campus, \$29.7 billion with the European Union [5], plus other \$8 billions to Japan, Venezuela, Argentina and other countries. This accounts for a staggering debt of \$60 billions.

Since 1992 Castro hasn’t paid the external debt and therefore cannot obtain more credit from those countries. There is only one country that Castro’s brothers don’t have a debt with (except for the confiscation of American properties that is one of the main reasons for the establishment of the embargo), from which they could obtain credits, the United States.

If in the last eighteen years the infusion of thousands of millions of dollars from European Union, Latin America, Japan, Canada, etc. have not reached the hands of the Cuban people, nor the millions of tourists that have visited the Island have been able to influence a political and economic opening of Castro’s regime, who could maintain the illusion that tourism and trade with the United States can do it?

Harms – Human Rights – 1NC

2. Double standards make US human rights policy ineffective – a single change like the plan doesn't change the overall structure.

Mertus 04 (Julie Mertus, Professor School of International Service @ American University)
"Bait and Switch Human Rights and US Foreign Policy" 2004. P1-3 (<http://www.doc88.com/p-672121731835.html>) (HT)

The United States is in fact still leading the world on human rights, but in the wrong direction, promoting short-term instrumentalism over long-term ethical principles, double standards instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of human nature over a more open one. An increasingly sophisticated array of nongovernmental organizations (NUGOs) and other leaders in civil society continue to demand that human rights ideas be more fully incorporated into U.S. foreign policy. To some extent, these advocates have succeeded in framing public policy choices in human rights terms, but too often competing interests eclipse human rights considerations. Human rights talk has not been accompanied by human rights behaviors. This is not the book I set out to write. When I began this project in the fall of 2000, I intended to test the thesis that human rights norms had a significant impact on both the White House and the Pentagon because they had become "deeply embedded," or, if you prefer, "institutionalized." I thought I would find that human rights norms had, in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's words, "become so widely accepted that they [had been] internalized by actors and achieved a 'taken-for-granted' quality that [made] compliance...almost automatic." I was particularly interested in analyzing how human rights norms shape the identity, interests, expectations, and behaviors of Americans who make, implement, and influence decisions concerning military intervention and other forms of American involvement across state borders. I had high hopes of finding human rights deeply embedded in - U.S. foreign policy. I discovered that human rights norms had shaped identities, but that human rights were not a taken-for-granted factor in shaping behavior. In particular, I discovered that the American public would tolerate and even participate in behavior running contrary to human rights tenets. The events following September 11 assured me of my failed thesis, but the interviews I conducted in and around Washington, D.C., long before then had already tipped me off that something is seriously awry with the way the United States "does" human rights. Policy makers may talk about human rights now more than ever, but the talk does not lead to consistent human rights abiding behaviors and decisions. The manner in which human rights have been understood and applied threatens to strip human rights ideas of their central content. While many of the government policy makers and military officers I interviewed for this book genuinely identified with being "on the side of human rights," their vision of human rights accommodated double standards: one for the United States, and another for the rest of the world. In other words, human rights are something the United States encourages for other countries, whereas the same international standards do not apply in the same manner in the United States. In the course of my research, I discovered that when I said "human rights" and when many of the governmental actors I was studying said "human rights," we were referring to two different things. I was referring to an understanding of human rights that, as explained below, incorporates three fundamental principles] the equality principle, the human dignity principle, and the moral worth principle. In contrast, the people and institutions that I was studying were most likely referring to a short list of American values, to be projected and applied to others in line with American national interests. By explicitly or implicitly understanding human rights as something done "out there" and to "other people," and in failing to apply human rights norms to the United States on equal terms, they were undercutting the core nature of human rights. Although the rhetoric on human rights has changed from presidential administration to administration, manifestations of American exceptionalism appear in every presidency. Harold Hongju Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor during part of the Clinton administration 0998-2004 .stresses that some forms of American exceptionalism present little danger to the future of human rights, 4 For example, that the United States has a distinctive rights culture and often uses distinctive legal terminology is not troubling. Indeed, the distinctiveness of the United States may benefit human rights claimants. However, the use of a double standard may be devastating both for U.S. human rights foreign policy and for the future of human rights. Koh points to at least four problems with a double-standard approach to human rights: (1) the undercutting of U.S. ability to pursue an affirmative human rights agenda; (2) the cooptation of the United States into condoning or defending other countries' human rights abuses; (3) the weakening of the United States' claim to lead globally through moral authority; and (4) the undermining of the legitimacy of human rights norms.

Harms – Human Rights – Embargo is Good

Lifting the embargo will only make human rights abuses worse. The embargo isn't responsible for the problems, the Castro brothers are.

Corzo, 2009 (Humberto, degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Havana, has 45 years of experience as an engineer working in the United States, "Lift the Cuba Embargo?", April 2009, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y09/abril09/09_O_3.html)

In her excellent analysis of the Cuban economy published in Revista Hispano Cubana, No. 14 [7] she wrote "Before the demise of the URRS, in Cuba the embargo was not even talked about but now it has become a mater of live or death for the regime, since only the financial flux from the United States, opening the possibility of obtaining lines of credit, the American tourism and the increment of the remittances of relatives, will allow the regime to confront the desperate situation in which it has submerge the country. In an article on the Wall Street Journal [8] she says, "The State has failed to redistribute the resources in an equitable way and has created a very serious situation of inequality. Economic growth requires foreign investments, but the possibilities of important foreign investments are minimal due to the conditions created by the control of the state. When one understands the great impact with which the policy of the system has towards investments and commerce, it is very easy to see that the influence of the embargo in Cuba's poverty is minimal". Speaking in Havana on November 2002 during the first session of Cuba's National Assembly Castro dismissed any possibility of success to the opponents of the regime. He said: "There is no opposition to speak of because the dissidents are like fish in an empty fish tank; there is no oxygen left for the counterrevolution and there will be even less in the future" Lifting the embargo Cuban economy's bankruptcy is the sole responsibility of Castro's regime. Under this system the economy will continuous to deteriorate without any hope of improvement. The economy is closely linked to the social development and standard of living of the Cuban people, which make very difficult the improvement of those under the existing regime. Cuba's problems are not the result of the embargo; they are due to the corruption and ineffectiveness of a system that is against private property and free enterprise. These and no others are the real reasons of the problems. Lifting the embargo and travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will: 1. Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures. 2. Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses owned by the Cuban government. 3. Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and the leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution. 4. Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy on the island.

Harms – Human Rights – North Korean Weapons

Cuba sends missiles and fighter jets to North Korea – and lots of trade has been going on secretly.

Fox News Latino July 25th, 2013 (“North Korean Ships Made Frequent Visits To Cuba, Monitors Say”, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/25/north-korean-ships-made-frequent-visits-to-cuba-monitors-say/>)

New information about North Korean freighters stopping in Cuba reveal a rise in trade between the two Communist nations amid last week’s scandal over smuggled weapon parts aboard a ship flagged under the Asian nation.

Shipping monitors indicated Wednesday that at least five North Korean freighters made port of call in Cuba over the last four years, with other ships from Pyongyang believed to have visited the island under different flags or ownership documents. The Miami Herald reported.

“The trade numbers are fuzzy but clearly there’s been more contact between the two countries in recent years.” Michael Madden, editor of the North Korea Leadership Watch, told the Herald.

Discovered hidden under 220,000 sacks of sugar on the ship called the Chong Chon Gang were aging anti-aircraft missiles, two Soviet-era Russian-made MIG-21 fighter jets and 15 plane engines. The ship, which sailed Cuba en route to Panama, was seized a week ago after officials discovered weapons that Cuban officials were “obsolete” and had been shipped out to be repaired and returned to the island.

Panamanian authorities, including President Ricardo Martinelli, toured the boat and expressed their anger and dismay that the planes and weapons were attempting to cross through the Panama Canal.

“You are all here and are sensing the strong odor of fuel, to such a degree that no one can know what danger Panama was put in,” Panama’s Attorney General Ana Belfon told the BBC of the gasoline smell that emanated from the plane’s fuselages.

The government has said a team of technical experts from the United Nations is expected in Panama during the first week in August to inspect the cargo and determine if it violates the arms embargo currently in place against North Korea.

Harms – Human Rights – North Korean Weapons

The ship that got stopped in Panama is just the tip of the iceberg – other ships could have been carrying other dangerous items.

Fox News Latino July 25th, 2013 (“North Korean Ships Made Frequent Visits To Cuba, Monitors Say”, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/25/north-korean-ships-made-frequent-visits-to-cuba-monitors-say/>)

The ship's crew has been charged with violating the country's national security, transporting military equipment and not declaring it.

The North Korean captain of the ship tried to commit suicide when discovered and 35 crewmen were arrested after resisting police efforts to intercept the ship.

Under current sanctions, all U.N. member states are prohibited from directly or indirectly supplying, selling or transferring arms, missiles or missile systems and the equipment and technology to North Korea, with the exception of small arms and light weapons. The ship's circuitous and mysterious route to and from Cuba has also given pause to some experts, especially when the Chong Chon Gang turned off its location transponder when it entered the Caribbean in early June.

What is known of the ship's voyage is that it left Nakhodka in the Russian Far East – about 125 miles east of the North Korea border – on April 12 and made it to the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal on May 31. Since entering the Caribbean on June 1 until it attempted to re-cross the Canal loaded with the weapons on July 11 there is no information of its movement and thus way to determine where the ship stopped in Cuba.

The other North Korean ships to stop in Cuba had all made port at the sugar-exporting port of Puerto Padre, with forays to Havana and Santiago de Cuba as well.

All five North Korean ships were owned by Ocean Maritime Management (OMM), a state shipping company based in Pyongyang, and operated in “a classic shell company network,” according to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which monitors international shipping reports.

Matthew Godsey of the Wisconsin Project told the Miami Herald that **these stops by North Korean ships might only be the tip of the iceberg as these records don't include visits by ships flagged or owned outside of North Korea. Under so-called "flags of convenience," countries and owners can register their ships in other countries to avoid law enforcement oversight or hide their identity.**

And, Cuba has bioweapons and could be willing to sell them to adversaries.

Steyn, 2007 [Mark, Editor, Newsmax, 4/8, Insider Report: Intel Official: Cuba Has Biological Weapons, <http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/4/7/204548.shtml>]

Cuba "almost certainly" has the ability to use weapons of mass destruction against the U.S., a former senior U.S. intelligence official tells NewsMax. The official responded to a recent NewsMax report by Kenneth R. Timmerman regarding Congress' closed-door briefing about a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst who spied for Cuba for 16 years. Ana Belen Montes was arrested in September 2001 on spying charges, but until now most of the details of her work as a traitor have remained classified. The Montes affair "has even bigger strategic significance than generally recognized," the intelligence official opined. "Cuba started an offensive biological weapons program in the 1960s as part of its launch into bio-tech medicine and engineering, where it has long been advanced and energetic. "In the '60s or '70s, they are reported to have run a funny little experiment to see how they might deliver biological weapons via bottles thrown into the Gulf Stream. "Throughout the '70s and '80s, it was common knowledge that Cuba had a biological weapons program. One of the great values of Montes was that she basically instructed Havana on how to conceal it. "The strategic significance of this is that Cuba almost certainly has a WMD capability against the U.S. in the form of offensive biological weapons configured for swift delivery, or possibly pre-emplacment. Covert delivery — not via MiGs or missiles — would be the best mode." The biggest value of this weapons program for Cuba would be to deter the U.S. "in the event of a confrontation over some scenario of 'regime change' or preservation when Castro dies," the official continued. "Many thousands could die if such a scenario escalated." Cuba could also sell or give biological weapons to American adversaries, warned the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "Montes illustrates the great effectiveness of Cuban offensive and defensive [counter] intelligence," the official added. "They learned from the best of the Soviet bloc partners and then improved even on them. This has given them the ability to sell or give all sorts of intelligence goodies to U.S. adversaries around the world." Among other things, Montes, in 1998, authored a National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba that discounted the communist nation's biological weapons research. But as recently as February, the Miami Herald reported that a former top Cuban military official was calling for international weapons inspections of a secret underground lab near Havana, where he said Castro's government was conducting research in offensive biological weapons.

Harms – Human Rights – Security Outweighs Rights

Security concerns prevent realization of HR

Lebovic & Voeten 06 (James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1981)(Erik Voeten is the Peter F. Krogh assistant professor of geopolitics and global justice at the School of Foreign Service and the department of Government) **LEBOVIC, J. H. and VOETEN, E. (2006),** “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 50: 861–888.

(<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full>) (HT)

Human rights are at best a peripheral or indirect concern in realist treatments of international politics. For contemporary neorealists, **security is a state's singularly important policy objective.** Given the logic of the “security dilemma” by which no state is permanently secure and all states can procure security only at another's expense, states must marshal their resources to increase their capabilities and offset gains by competitors ([Waltz 1979](#)). **States cannot afford the cost of pursuing objectives that will little effect,** or might deleteriously effect, **the capability balance.** Neither can they afford the distractions of unnecessary conflict, as would most likely result from interfering in the domestic affairs of another state. This stark realist contention offers a relatively visible and convenient target for testing: human rights records should not explain why countries voted as they did in the UNCHR or which countries were targeted or punished by the commission, regardless of time period. In this realist view, the **narrow pursuit of security objectives is a timeless feature of international competition.**

Harms – Human Rights – No Human Rights

Pointing out Human Rights abuses is just a tactic for international posturing – no countries actually show real concern for human rights.

Lebovic & Voeten 06 (James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1981)(Erik Voeten is the Peter F. Krogh assistant professor of geopolitics and global justice at the School of Foreign Service and the department of Government) LEBOVIC, J. H. and VOETEN, E. (2006), “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 50: 861–888.

(<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full>) (HT)

The contest for legitimacy within institutions such as the UNCHR* amounts to what [Krasner \(1999\)](#) labels an “organized hypocrisy” in which **states selectively observe global norms and subordinate them to the principles of power politics. Governments may talk the talk when it comes to human rights, but their intent is to inflict political damage on foreign adversaries, not to induce them to treat their citizens according to some universally accepted standard.**

This thesis receives considerable support from [Donnelly's \(1988\)](#) finding that the UNCHR was strongly biased and regularly applied double standards in its evaluation of states (although Donnelly notes that bias declined significantly in the 1980s). It also fits the popular assertion that the UNCHR was **in the business of “selling morality”** ([Loconte 2004](#)).

If organized hypocrisy best characterizes the behavior of the UNCHR, we expect that **governments used the UNCHR* for strategic reasons: they attacked rivals and assisted allies—whatever their actual rights records—so as to serve broader, political strategies.**

Given that the United States held countries accountable publicly for their rights practices, and that these countries reciprocated by holding the United States and its allies accountable for their rights practices, we expect that US alignment (right-wing governance and UN alignment, more generally) will feature heavily in shaming efforts, then, as countries target and punish these countries whatever their actual levels of abuse. Of note is that the UN was frequently criticized during the Cold War for singling out pro-Western and right-wing governments while ignoring the excesses committed by left-leaning regimes (e.g., [Franck 1985](#); [Donnelly 1988](#)) and that conflict in the UN continues to be dominated by clashes between the United States and its ideological adversaries ([Voeten 2000](#)).

Given the underlying logic, **countries are not above using their rights records to political advantage against countries with poor records.** In turn, rights abusers will do their part to sully those good records with charges of abuse to undercut the “moral advantage” of the accusers. In fact, **traded accusations of abuse are part of a larger ideational contest if the literature on hegemonic stability is correct that strong states seek to pursue their policies within a facilitative ideological context.**

*UNCHR – United Nations Commission on Human Rights

Harms – Human Rights – Human Rights Aren't Absolute

There are instances in which violating human rights is morally justified.

Cooray 96 - For 38 years he studied and worked in Universities in Sri Lanka, England and Australia. He obtained a first class honours degree from the University of Ceylon in 1961. He chose the University of Cambridge where he obtained a degree of doctor of Philosophy in 1968. He later obtained a second doctors degree from the University of Colombo (Doctor Mark, "22.5 Human Rights Are Not Absolute", 1996, <http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/btof/chap225.htm>)/CB

Restrictions On Rights

In countries which have bills of rights there is a basic statement of freedoms subject to permitted abridgment of such freedoms.

Freedoms are restricted in the public interest on grounds of national security, to preserve public order, to protect public health, to maintain moral standards, to secure due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others or to meet the just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society. The United States Supreme Court has over the years qualified the rights in the constitution. **Any statement of rights is not absolute and must of necessity be subject to limitations on the above lines.** The right of free speech and expression does not extend to sedition, slander, defamation and obscenity. The principle of equality before the law cannot deny a legislature the power to classify persons for legislative purposes and to legislate affecting them, provided that the classification is not arbitrary and is based on a real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the objects sought to be achieved. Thus the legislature could enact legislation regulating the activities of money lenders. This would amount to a singling out of money lenders and would be prima facie in conflict with the principle of equality before the law. But provided the classification is reasonable and there is a legitimate object to be achieved the legislation would nonetheless be valid. **The above are instances of legitimate restrictions of rights. They are intended to illustrate that no right available to an individual or group is or can be absolute. This seems obvious but is often not appreciated.**

The Clash Of Rights

The reality that human rights are not absolute, and are subject to reasonable restrictions, does not mean that the rights can be arbitrarily curtailed according to legislative or bureaucratic discretion. The manner in which restrictions are to be determined and imposed and the criteria which apply to the formulation of restrictions are crucial. **If human rights are to be meaningful they cannot be subject to crude majoritarian dictates.** What distinguishes a human right from any other right is that a human right is available to and enforceable by a minority, however small, even against the wishes of a majority. **If human rights were to become subject to ordinary parliamentary control they would be no different from any other statutory right** which parliament is free to confer and withdraw at its pleasure. **The restriction of human rights is therefore a crucial and delicate question.** They cannot be based on ideological perceptions of parliamentarians, bureaucrats or the Human Rights Commission but must be grounded on objectively ascertained and comprehended criteria.

Harms – Human Rights – Weigh All Consequences

Weighing the consequences of actions is important to evaluating their morality.

Isaac 2002 – Professor of Political Science, Indiana (Jeffrey, “Ends, Means and Politics,” Dissent 49.2, p 35-6, ebsco)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

This applies in this debate because _____

Harms – Human Rights – War Turns the Advantage

Conflict destroys Human Rights – they get abandoned – means our impact turns theirs.

Watkin 04 (Kenneth Watkin, Colonel and Deputy Judge Advocate General/Operations, Canadian Forces, visiting fellow in the Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School) (“CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE: A ROLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS”, American Journal of International Law January, 2004) (<http://www.asil.org/ajil/watkin.pdf>) (HT)

The level of state control and intervention raises significant issues of privacy and the potential for abuse. The Reign of Terror launched by the generator of the levée en masse, the French National Assembly, introduced the term “terror” into the modern lexicon.⁸⁷ It is no coincidence that efforts to control the power of the state and its impact on individual citizens spawned human rights norms. Human rights are generally “concerned with the organization of State power vis-à-vis the individual” and, as such, “found their natural expression in domestic constitutional law.”⁸⁸ This focus on the individual in respect of power wielded by the state is fundamental to international human rights law. **Within states the application of human rights norms reflects the challenges associated with maintaining order. Some human rights may be derogated from during “emergencies”** to facilitate the maintenance of public order. While the exercise of such powers is controversial and by law strictly controlled, their existence demonstrates that internal threats to the security of the state can reach the level of interfering with governance.⁸⁹ (For example, **the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**, supra note 64, Art. 4, the **European Convention for Human Rights**, supra note 65, Art. 15, and the **American Convention on Human Rights**, Nov. 22, 1969, Art. 27, 1144 UNTS 123, **all provide for the suspension of certain rights in times of crisis like wars** and emergencies) That derogations are not permitted with regard to the right to life is a strong statement of the fundamental importance of that right. At the same time, anyone interpreting the right to life must be prepared to deal with situations, such as emergencies, where a significant degree of violence is being threatened or used. As important as civilian police forces are to the maintenance of internal order, the policing of a state is not always a function of civil police alone. **Some states employ security forces of a paramilitary nature or legally empower military forces to perform internal policing duties.**⁹⁰ In some cases **modern terrorism has stimulated the substantial militarization of police forces.** Thus, different states may use either police or military forces to perform the same function (i.e., rescuing hostages). **This blurring of lines between police and military forces further highlights the possible heights to which violence can rise in internal conflict.**

Solvency – Human Rights – 1NC

1. Turn – Too much too fast causes instability—the plan’s hasty approach risks civil war.

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted.

Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible.

To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

2. They can't solve their advantage

Solvency – Human Rights – 1NC

3. Lifting embargo empowers Castro, causes HR violations

López, 2012 (Juan J. Lopez, Ph.D. Director of Research @ Research Office (College of Arts & Sciences) at Florida International University) Implication of the US Economic embargo for a Political Transition in Cuba. Endowment for Cuban American Studies of the Cuban American National Foundation, 1998.

(<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume7/pdfs/Lopez.pdf>) (HT)

An alternative to maintaining the embargo is to lift it. It is an illusion to believe that ending the embargo will lead to greater respect for human rights in Cuba or encourage a negotiated political transition under the Castro regime. The failure of normal international relations between Cuba and countries in Latin America and Western Europe to achieve political liberalization or respect for human rights supports this conclusion. **The foremost goal of the ruling elite is to perpetuate itself in power. The strategy of the dictatorship apparently is to obtain enough foreign exchange from its international transactions to muddle through while refusing to allow political liberalization. The Castro government is not willing to pay the price of respect for human rights for better international economic relations.** Lifting the embargo would not mean that the Castro government would allow significant market-oriented economic reforms nor that there would be a dramatic improvement in economic performance. The Cuban government has refused to move beyond quite limited market reforms while engaging in economic relations with countries other than the United States. **Yet lifting the embargo would help the Castro regime to survive.** Besides handling a political victory to the Cuban government, the end of the embargo would increase the financial resources available to the regime with which to ease the pressures it confronts arising from Cuba's economic situation. The end of the **embargo would make a political transition less likely.** The likelihood that Fidel would die of natural causes while in office would be greater. The current regime could last for an additional decade. Under the best outcome in this scenario, after Fidel dies a different type of regime could emerge in which a negotiated transition becomes possible. But the emergence of such a regime is not assured after the death of Fidel. It is possible that his younger brother, Raúl, the second in command in Cuba, could be able to maintain the current regime. In any event, **anyone willing to bet on helping the Castro regime survive for the sake of a possible negotiated transition at some point in the distant future must not lose sight of the fact that people in Cuba have been living in hell for a long time.**

Solvency – Human Rights – Economic Engagement Fails

Economic engagement fails – the plan won't help the people of Cuba.

Suchlicki 7 - Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (Jaime, "Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban", Front Page Mag, April 11 2007, [//CB">http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082">//CB](http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082)

American tourists will not bring democracy to Cuba. Over the past decades hundreds of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. **The assumption that tourism or trade will lead to economic and political change is not borne out by empirical studies. In Eastern Europe, communism collapsed a decade after tourism peaked. No study of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union claims that tourism, trade or investments had anything to do with the end of communism.** A disastrous economic system, competition with the West, successive leadership changes with no legitimacy, anti-Soviet feeling in Eastern Europe and the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan were among the reasons for change. **There is no evidence to support the notion that engagement with a totalitarian state will bring about its demise. Only academic ideologues and those interested in economic gains cling to this notion.** Their calls for ending the embargo have little to do with democracy in Cuba or the welfare of the Cuban people. **The repeated statement that the embargo is the cause of Cuba's economic problems is hollow. The reasons for the economic misery of the Cubans are a failed political and economic system.** Like the communist systems of Eastern Europe, Cuba's system does not function, stifles initiative and productivity and destroys human freedom and dignity.

Solvency – Human Rights – Plan Makes Human Rights Worse

Lifting the embargo destroys human rights – Collapse of the health system and workforce

Garrett 2012 (LAURIE GARRETT is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?" August 2010 <http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmem/Articles/Castrocare%20in%20Crisis.pdf>)

According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, **if Washington lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers** and then the creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public. **The system's lower, public tier would be at risk of complete collapse.** Ullmann therefore suggests "fostering this [public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He also argues that **officials in both governments should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country."** Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy -- part public, part locally owned and private, and part outsourced and private -- that could compensate Cuban physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers enough to keep them in the country and working at least part time in the public sector.

The only U.S. policy currently in place, however, encourages Cuban physicians to immigrate to the United States. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a special parole program under which health-care **workers who defect from Cuba are granted legal residence in the United States while they prepare for U.S. medical licensing** examinations. An estimated 2,000 physicians have taken advantage of the program. Although few have managed to gain accreditation as U.S. doctors, largely due to their poor English-language skills and the stark differences between Cuban and U.S. medical training, many now work as nurses in Florida hospitals.

The Castro government, meanwhile, is in a seemingly untenable position. The two greatest achievements of the Cuban Revolution -- 100 percent literacy and quality universal health care -- depend on huge streams of government spending. If Washington does eventually start to normalize relations, **plugging just a few holes in the embargo wall would require vast additional spending by the Cuban government. The government would have to pay higher salaries to teachers, doctors, nurses, and technicians; strengthen the country's deteriorating infrastructure; and improve working conditions for common workers.** To bolster its health-care infrastructure and create incentives for Cuban doctors to stay in the system, **Cuba will have to find external support from donors, such as the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development. But few sources will support Havana with funding as long as the regime restricts the travel of its citizens.**

In the long run, Cuba will need to develop a taxable economic base to generate government revenues -- which would mean inviting foreign investment and generating serious employment opportunities. **The onus is on the Castro government** to demonstrate how the regime could adapt to the easing or lifting of the U.S. embargo. Certainly, **Cuban leaders already know that their health triumphs would be at risk.**

Solvency – Human Rights – US Action Counterproductive

US actions are more likely to cause blowback than actually help people in Cuba – that will cause a net decrease in influence.

Weeks & Fiorey 12 a. associate professor of political science and director of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte & b. M.A. candidate [Gregory Weeks & Erin Fiorey, Policy Options for a Cuban Spring, May-June 2012, MILITARY REVIEW http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120630_art014.pdf

U.S. Money Won't Cause Change in Cuba What would a Cuban transition look like? Why would it start? No one predicted the Arab Spring, and for Cuba the many possible permutations are well beyond the scope of this article. Cuban opposition blogger Yoani Sánchez writes that Cubans view transition as similar to a dilapidated building in Havana: “The hurricanes don't bring it down and the rains don't bring it down, but one day someone tries to change the lock on the front door and the whole edifice collapses.”¹⁵ In any event, given the hermetic nature of the regime and its successful resistance to U.S. influence, it is very unlikely that the United States will have much influence over its initiation.

As the prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá argues, “One talks about the United States' money for civil society The United States' money won't cause change in Cuba.”¹⁶ It is a point he has made repeatedly. If there is a Cuban Spring, then its emergence and ultimate success will hinge on its domestic wellsprings. In fact, this echoes the policy position of the administration of Barack Obama. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in 2011, “These revolutions are not ours. They are not by us, for us, or against us, but we do have a role. We have the resources, capabilities, and expertise to support those who seek peaceful, meaningful, democratic reform.”¹⁷ Even the Catholic Cardinal in Cuba, Jaime Ortega, has cautioned against “a type of U.S. subculture which invades everything”¹⁸ He was referring not only to culture, but also to politics.

What the wariness entails is an increased risk of backlash if the United States injects itself too forcefully. The United States faced a similar dilemma in the Arab Spring Middle Eastern transitions. Widespread perception that the United States is attempting to direct events fosters distrust and provides leverage to pro-regime forces or at the very least puts leaders on the defensive who might otherwise welcome assistance from the United States. This is commonly referred to as “blowback,” and over the long term, it could greatly reduce U.S. influence.

Harms – Soft Power – 1NC

1. Poor relations with Latin America are inevitable because the United States has very different priorities.

Hakim 11 President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue [Peter Hakim, *The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed*, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011]

During the following ten years, US foreign policy attention turned sharply to the Middle East. Washington's integrationist strategy for the Americas unravelled as its weaknesses and inconsistencies became increasingly visible. For their part, Latin American governments became increasingly independent and assertive in their foreign policies, diversified in their international relations, and more inclined to challenge US leadership and initiative. The United States has not yet come fully to grips with this changing context of hemispheric relations. The G.W. Bush and Obama administrations remained, at least rhetorically, wedded to the idea of partnerships and shared responsibilities with Latin America, but these concepts seem less and less relevant to the region's evolving context.

What the past two decades of US–Latin American relations may have most clearly revealed is how difficult it is for Washington to define and execute a coherent policy in the region—with officials constrained by domestic politics, far more urgent demands on its foreign policy resources, and an increasingly independent and self-assured Latin America. The fact is that US policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean are almost invariably derivative policies. They tend not to be the result of a careful calculation of US interests and values and a clear view of what it will take to advance them. Instead, they tend to be mostly shaped by US domestic political considerations or by the demands of global issues.

2. Their impact is overstated because _____

3. US leadership doesn't prevent conflict.

Fettweis 10—Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College [Christopher J. Fettweis, "Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy," *Survival*, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010, pages 59—82//informaworld]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending \$100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.²⁹ To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.³⁰ And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

Harms – Soft Power – 1NC

4. Soft power is useless—no impact to boosting U.S. credibility

Miller 10 [2/3/2010, Aaron David, public-policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Foreign Policy, “The End of Diplomacy?”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/03/the_end_of_diplomacy?page=full]

Back in the day, there was a time when American diplomacy did big and important things. No more, it seems. The world's gotten complicated, America is a good deal weaker, and the U.S. administration is handicapping itself with a dysfunctional bureaucratic setup that makes it harder to focus and find its footing. Effective American diplomacy may well be going the way of the dodo, and the sad fact is there may be little Barack Obama can do about it. Lamenting the absence of great men years before his own shining moment, Winston Churchill wrote that in England, once upon a time, "there were wonderful giants of old." There's always a danger in idealizing what once was or seemed to be in order to make a point about the present. Still, looking back over the last 60 years, you really do have to wonder whether America's best diplomacy and foreign policy are behind it. America never ran the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe; but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s, 1988-1991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward impressive ends. There were, or course, disasters and plenty of dysfunction during these years, including the Vietnam War and out-of-control CIA operations. But there were also brilliant achievements: the Marshall Plan, NATO, effective Arab-Israeli diplomacy, détente with the Russians, opening to China, a competent American role in the acceleration and management of the end of the Cold War, and the first Gulf War. For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- America has been in a diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, wars of choice, and nasty regional conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of the shuttling secretary of state pre-empting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy seems a world away. The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small. In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nation-building, and maybe one part diplomacy. And America is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American elements and place their security and political concerns first. Even in areas where diplomacy might seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which its own allies (Israel, Pakistan, and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran. What's more, the power of the small is being matched by the weakening of the big. You don't have to be a declinist (I'm not) to see how far the image of American power has fallen. Forget the economic meltdown, which has much of the world wondering about what kind of great power the United States really is. America's currently fighting two wars where the standard for victory is not whether it can win but when it can leave. Whether it's an inability to get tough sanctions from the international community against Iran, bring Tehran to heel, make North Korea play ball, get the Arabs and the Israelis to cooperate, or push the Pakistanis to hit the Taliban and al Qaeda in a sustained way, the world has gotten used to saying no to America without cost or consequence. And that's very bad for a great power. Finally, there's the issue of how the country organizes itself. A new bureaucratic flowchart won't replace skill and luck, better marshal American power, or create genuine opportunities for success abroad. But if you don't have the right structure, it makes success all that much harder. And the United States has departed from the one model that has proven successful: the strong foreign-policy president empowering the strong secretary of state who rides herd over subcabinet-level envoys in real time and in close coordination with the president on strategy. Instead, the Obama administration has created an empire of envoys with power concentrated in the White House but without real purpose or strategy. The nation's top diplomat (the secretary of state) seems to be everywhere and nowhere in terms of owning issues and finding a way to take on some of the nastiest challenges, which is what secretaries of state are supposed to do. It's still early, and maybe the Obama administration will get lucky. Perhaps the Iranian regime will collapse or the Arabs and Israelis will do something good by themselves. But the next several years are more likely to be tough ones for American diplomacy. And the image that comes to mind isn't a terribly kind one: America as a kind of modern-day Gulliver tied up by tiny tribes abroad and hobbled by its inability to organize its own house at home.

Harms – Soft Power – Too Much Anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism in Latin America is too entrenched for one policy change to matter.

Kinzer 6/25/13 - Stephen Kinzer is a former New York Times reporter and the author of *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (2006) and *Reset Middle East: Old Friends and New Alliances: Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Iran* (2011) (Stephen, "Latin America is ready to defy the US over Snowden and other issues", *The Guardian*, June 25 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/25/edward-snowden-ecuador-defy-united-states//CB>)

During the 1990s **the United States sought to impose the "Washington Consensus" on Latin American governments. It embodied what Latin Americans call "neo-liberal" principles: budget cuts, privatization, deregulation of business, and incentives for foreign companies. This campaign sparked bitter resistance and ultimately collapsed.**

In spite of these military, political, and economic assaults – or perhaps because of them – **much of Latin America has become profoundly dissatisfied with the made-in-USA model. Some of the continent's most popular leaders rose to power by denouncing the "Washington Consensus" and pledging to pull their countries out of the United States orbit.**

Because President Hugo Chavez of **Venezuela was the most** flamboyant of these **defiant** leaders, some outsiders may have expected that following his death, the region would return to its traditional state of submission. In fact, not just a handful of leaders but **huge populations in Latin America have decided that they wish for more independence from Washington.**

Harms – Soft Power – Other Things Hurt Relations

Lots of issues other than the embargo hurt US-Cuba relations.

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113>] What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?

Experts say these issues include:

Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.

Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period.

Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

Harms – Soft Power – Soft Power is Ineffective

No impact to soft power—believers exaggerate benefits—hard power is comparatively more important

Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by Strategic Studies Institute]

Soft power is potentially a dangerous idea not because it is unsound, which it is not, but rather for the faulty inference that careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied in practice by those unwary observers. Concepts can be tricky. They seem to make sense of what otherwise is intellectually undergoverned space, and thus potentially come to control pliable minds. Given that men behave as their minds suggest and command, it is easy to understand why Clausewitz

identified the enemy’s will as the target for influence.³⁷ Beliefs about soft power in turn have potentially negative implications for attitudes toward the hard power of military force and economic muscle. Thus, soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration. What does this mean? To begin with a vital contrast: whereas military force and economic pressure (negative or positive) can be applied by choice as to quantity and quality, soft power cannot. (Of course, the enemy/rival too has a vote on the outcome, regardless of the texture of the power applied.) But hard power allows us to decide how we will play in shaping and modulating the relevant narrative, even though the course of history must be an interactive one once the engagement is joined. In principle, we can turn the tap on or off at our discretion. The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted above, the enemy, contingency, and friction will intervene.

But still a noteworthy measure of initiative derives from the threat and use of military force and economic power. But soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy. In fact, I am tempted to challenge the proposition that soft power can even be regarded as one (or more) among the grand strategic instruments of policy. The seeming validity and attractiveness of soft power lead to easy exaggeration of its potency. Soft power is admitted by all to defy metric analysis, but this is not a fatal weakness. Indeed, the instruments of hard power that do lend themselves readily to metric assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive. But the metrics of tactical calculation need not be strategically revealing. It is important to win battles, but victory in war is a considerably different matter than the simple accumulation of tactical successes. Thus, the burden of proof remains on soft power: (1) What is this concept of soft power? (2) Where does it come from and who or what controls it? and (3)

Prudently assessed and anticipated, what is the quantity and quality of its potential influence? Let us now consider answers to these questions. 7. Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the (generally unavailable) alternative to military

and economic power. The first of the three questions posed above all but invites a misleading answer. Nye plausibly offers the co-optation of people rather than their coercion as the defining principle of soft power.³⁸ The source of possible misunderstanding is the fact that merely by conjuring an alternative species of power, an obvious but unjustified sense of equivalence between the binary elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impression that the two options are like-for-like in their consequences, though not in their methods. By conceptually corraling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive assets under the umbrella of soft power, one is near certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context. Power of all kinds depends upon context for its value, but especially so for the soft variety. For power to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in the negative, not the positive. When soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.” In those cases, American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a counterproductive direction. These conclusions imply no criticism of American soft power per se. The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is a reliable instrument of policy that could complement or in some instances replace military force. 8. Soft power is perilously reliant on the calculations and feelings of frequently undermotivated foreigners. The second question above asked about the provenance and ownership of soft power. Nye correctly notes that “soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.”

He proceeds sensibly to contrast the armed forces along with plainly national economic assets with the “soft power resources [that] are separate from American government and only partly responsive to its purposes.”³⁹ Nye cites as a prominent example of this disjunction in responsiveness the fact that “[i]n the Vietnam era . . . American government policy and popular culture worked at cross-purposes.”⁴⁰ Although soft power can be employed purposefully as an instrument of national policy, such power is notably unpredictable in its potential influence, producing net benefit or harm. Bluntly stated, America is what it is, and there are many in the world who do not like what it is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to project American values in the hope, if not quite confident expectation, that “the American way” will be found attractive in alien parts of the world. Our hopes would seem to be achievement of the following: (1) love and respect of American ideals and artifacts (civilization); (2) love and respect of America; and (3) willingness to cooperate with American policy today and tomorrow. Admittedly, this agenda is reductionist, but the cause and desired effects are accurate enough. Culture is as culture does and speaks and produces. The soft power of values culturally expressed that others might find attractive is always at risk to negation by the evidence of national deeds that appear to contradict our cultural persona.

Harms – Soft Power – Soft Power Isn't Key to Hegemony

International credibility doesn't matter for hegemony

MacDonald and Parent 11—Former Research Fellow, International Security Program [Spring 2011, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Belfer Center at Harvard, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment” *International Security*, volume 35, issue 4, pages 7-44, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC_a_00034-MacDonald_proof2.pdf]

These arguments have a number of limitations. First, **opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation.** ²² The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. **Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure.** ²³ **The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive.** For instance, **after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, “The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness** but of realism. . . . But **Berlin was an entirely different question;** not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area.” ²⁴ **This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by concentrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse reputation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power’s capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power’s commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area.** ²⁵ **Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area.** During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman’s administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe. ²⁶ **Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance. Third, critics do not just oversell the hazards of retrenchment; they downplay the dangers of preventive war.** ²⁷ **Both Gilpin and Copeland praise the ability of preventive war to arrest great power decline by defusing the threat posed to a hegemonic power by an isolated challenger.** Such reasoning disregards the warning of Otto von Bismarck and others that **preventive war is “suicide from fear of death.”** ²⁸ In practice, **great powers operate in a much more constrained and complex security environment in which they face multiple threats on several fronts.** Powers pursuing preventive war are shouldering grave risks: preventive war may require resources that are unavailable or allies that are difficult to recruit, and defeat in preventive war opens floodgates to exploitation on multiple fronts. Even a successful war, if sufficiently costly, can weaken a great power to the point of vulnerability. ²⁹ For most great powers, the potential loss of security in the future as a result of relative decline rarely justifies inviting the hazards of war in the present.

Harms – Soft Power – No Impact to Hegemony

US decline will not spark wars.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, **hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemonies still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemonies may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation.** In addition, **hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.**

We believe **the empirical record supports these conclusions.** In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation.**

The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance

U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 **A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas.** Indeed, **even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory.** 100 **By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.** 101

Harms – Soft Power – No Impact to Hegemony

Comprehensive analysis proves that US decline won't necessarily cause conflict.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, **we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.**

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.**

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, **great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.**¹² Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and **declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract** their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only **a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in** as much as **61 percent of the cases** we examined.

Third, we argue that **the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take.** How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that **great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions** in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict.** In these ways, **states** respond to penalty the same way they do to plenty: they **seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means.** Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. **Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank.** In contrast, **none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.** Pg. 9-10

Harms – Soft Power – Hegemony Inevitable

Latent power sustains hegemony

Wohlforth 7— Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University [William, “Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis, A Tilted Balance,” Vol. 29 (1), Spring]

US military forces are stretched thin, its **budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways** by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted **many analysts** to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it **fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must** be careful to take **into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them**. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, **one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged**. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “**self-inflicted overstretch**”—a situation **in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power**. This **is** arguably **the situation** that **the United States is in** today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. **The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could** also **spend its military budget more efficiently**, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, **there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support**. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that **unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize**. It is often noted that **the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers**. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that **a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power**.

Solvency – Soft Power – 1NC

1. Incompatible political views mean good relations with Cuba are impossible.

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113>] What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations?

A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

2. They can't solve their advantage

3. There are multiple obstacles other than Cuba to US relations with the rest of Latin America.

Hakim 11 President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue [Peter Hakim, *The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed*, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011]

In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in the hemisphere. Instead, he saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation. Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasis—fundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of the United States and Latin American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.

Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin America, but his administration has not managed to improve the quality of US–Latin American relations or develop more productive regional ties.

The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin America. Foreign policy has generally taken a back seat to the US' economic problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin America has had no chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy attention with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle.

The intense and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem. Neither Democrats nor Republicans have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of immigration reform, which remains the highest priority issue for Mexico and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean.¹⁶ Though the US Congress finally ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the House voted for both pacts. A Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation of Cuba policy. Finally, an increasingly assertive and politically divided Latin America has also complicated US policymaking. Only a few countries are openly hostile to Washington, but across the region, governments have demonstrated a growing independence from the US. They have built diverse relations internationally, and increasingly resisted US approaches. These are natural trends for a region of middle income countries that is expanding economically, more confident of its ability to resolve its own problems, and developing a significant global presence. They do not necessarily represent a setback for the United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric partnerships. But, today they are a major source of friction in US–Latin American relations, which have been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore Cuba to OAS membership, South American opposition to the US–Colombia defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other nations.

Solvency – Soft Power – 1NC

4. US unilateral approach towards Cuba can backfire – it's better to wait for Cuba to change on its own.

Lopez March 5th, 2013 (Vanessa Lopez, Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. She is currently pursuing a **Law Degree at Emory University**, “The Failure of U.S. Attempts at Unilateral Rapprochement with Cuba”, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue187.htm) (JN)

History demonstrates that unilateral U.S. efforts have had, and are having, no impact on Cuba's leadership. On the contrary, the Cuban government has interpreted U.S. openings towards Cuba as signs of weakness, which have resulted in Cuba's hostility towards the U.S. and in some instances, in reckless actions such as Mariel and the Balsero Crisis.

Improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba is a laudable goal, but to be successful, Cuba must be a willing participant. Cuba has an unambiguous pattern of harming U.S. interests when the U.S. has engaged in attempts of unilateral rapprochement. If the U.S. would like to protect its interests, it should demand that Cuba take the first step in any future efforts to improve relations between the two countries and offer irreversible concessions.

Solvency – Soft Power – Can’t Control Soft Power

The government cannot control soft power—it is the perception of the entire society that matters.

Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by Strategic Studies Institute]

Moreover, no contemporary U.S. government owns all of America’s soft power—a considerable understatement. Nor do contemporary Americans and their institutions own all of their country’s soft power. America today is the product of America’s many yesterdays, and the worldwide target audiences for American soft power respond to the whole of the America that they have perceived, including facts, legends, and myths.⁴¹ Obviously, what they understand about America may well be substantially untrue, certainly it will be incomplete. At a minimum, foreigners must react to an American soft power that is filtered by their local cultural interpretation. America is a futureoriented country, ever remaking itself and believing that, with the grace of God, history moves forward progressively toward an ever-better tomorrow. This optimistic American futurism both contrasts with foreigners’ cultural pessimism—their golden ages may lie in the past, not the future—which prevails in much of the world and is liable to mislead Americans as to the reception our soft power story will have.⁴² Many people indeed, probably most people, in the world beyond the United States have a fairly settled view of America, American purposes, and Americans. This locally held view derives from their whole experience of exposure to things American as well as from the features of their own “cultural thoughtways” and history that shape their interpretation of American-authored words and deeds, past and present.⁴³

Solvency – Soft Power – Can't Solve Cuba

Cuba does not want U.S. relations – low on their foreign policy agenda

Starr 13 - Dr. Pamela K. Starr is Director of the US-Mexico Network @ USC, an associate professor (NTT) in Public Diplomacy and the School of International Relations (Pamela, "As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not", Pacific Council on International Policy, May 2013, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539>)/CB

This reading of the Cuban attitude toward the United States was reinforced by a recitation of the history of Cuban responses to U.S. attempts to reduce bilateral hostility provided by the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Cuba, John Caulfield. We were reminded that **President Ford's efforts to reduce tensions were greeted by Cuba's decision to send troops to Angola. Carter's efforts to normalize relations were greeted by the Mariel boatlift. Clinton's were met by the shooting down of a Brothers to the Rescue plane.** Finally, most recently, **Obama efforts were greeted by the arrest and imprisonment of a USAID contractor on charges of espionage.** Although Caulfield did not explicitly connect the dots, his meaning was clear: Alan Gross was likely arrested either to prevent any reduction in tensions between the two countries or because **improving ties with the United States is simply not that important to Cuba.** Whatever the reason for Alan Gross' arrest, **it is clear that Cuba is not preoccupied with encouraging the United States to end the embargo. Time and again we were told that economic reform is Cuba's number one priority—the United States is not. The two countries do cooperate**—on hurricane tracking, drug trafficking, migration, and preparing for potential gulf oil spills—**but extending and improving bilateral cooperation is not high on the Cuban foreign policy agenda. Instead, Cuban foreign policy continues to emphasize efforts to maintain Cuban sovereignty and identity,** which Ambassador Alzugaray noted have historically been most directly threatened by the United States. It is now charged with supporting the economic reform process by promoting foreign direct investment and the diversification of Cuban economic ties. In this context, the only potential role for the United States in the coming years that was mentioned by our Cuban hosts is the growing role of Cuban-American investment in Cuba.

Solvency – Soft Power – Relations With Cuba are Impossible

Relations are beyond gone—the US will still maintain diplomatic isolation

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p111113>] What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?

They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from \$3,000 to just \$300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly \$710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached \$3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.

Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

Inherency – Embargo is Working

The Embargo is good. It's close to causing a democratic revolution.

Sadowski 12 Managing Editor of Production of the Journal of International Business and Law, Hoftra [Sadowski, Richard. "Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States' Embargo." Sustainable Development Law & Policy 12.1 (2012): 10.]

Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba's failures,⁹⁴ recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to accomplishing its goals.⁹⁵ Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil producers, want the embargo dropped. Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place until its goals are met. Environmental fears can be effectively countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately, with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan's bill, the United States should exercise its political and economic power to pressure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive communist rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in meeting the goals of the economic embargo.

Inherency – Travel Restrictions

The “People to People” education program already makes travel to Cuba possible – that should already solve the case by enabling American engagement with Cubans.

Steinmetz, July 25th 2013 (Thomas, German travel agent and journalist, “ALERT FOR US TRAVEL AGENTS: Floodgates to Cuba are already open”, eTurboNews, <http://www.eturbonews.com/print/36491>)

It appears as though tour operators are starting to get the hang of this People-to-People initiative, something several operators still didn't follow accordingly when it was first introduced. The People to People education program is an initiative that requires Americans to take part in various cultural experiences in Cuba, essentially, as the name implies, putting them in direct contact with the people of Cuba with hopes of learning about the way of life in the country.

It was implemented by President Clinton in 1999 and suspended by President Bush in 2004 before President Obama resurrected the program during his first term. Insight Cuba got the ball rolling in 2011.

After Insight Cuba became the first licensed operator to sell Cuba through the People-to-People initiative, other operators joined suit, including Collette Vacations, National Geographic Expeditions and International Expeditions.

But requirements were tightened last year after criticism that many of the trips were masking recreational tourism to the Communist island. Cuban-American Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida criticized the government for approving licenses for groups that included activities like salsa dancing.

But even the operators who failed at their first cracks of sending clients to Cuba have refined their programs to adhere to the tighter restrictions. Back in 2011, Globus was looking into sending U.S. clients to Cuba in

2012 on religious tours approved by the Center for Caribbean Religion and Culture. Those plans, however, were scrapped after the U.S. Department of the Treasury began cracking down on who these operators were getting their licenses from.

In May, however, Globus announced that it obtained a license that allows the operator to sell Cuba legally to U.S. clients through the People-to-People initiative. And like Globus, Abercrombie & Kent USA, which had tried to enter the Cuba market in September 2011, but pulled its programs pending a review and clarification of Cuba regulations, has also been approved recently for a license through the initiative.

Abercrombie & Kent's inaugural departure of Cuba: People to People is September 6-15, followed by additional departures throughout 2013 and into 2014.

Meanwhile, A U.S.-based tour company recently announced the launch of new People-to-People trips to Cuba that would transport U.S. citizens there by ship.

Road Scholar, a Boston-based company, is offering the trips from Jamaica and Miami, with stops in Havana and other parts of Cuba.

The U.S. Treasury Department confirmed in an email that transportation "whether by bus, boat or taxi" in Cuba is permitted as part of the People-to-People programs as long as it does not detract from a "full-time schedule of educational activities that will result in meaningful interaction between the travelers and individuals in Cuba."